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the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris. 
As in the previous editions, the report provides an up-to-date overview of existing and emerging carbon 
pricing instruments around the world, including national and subnational initiatives. Furthermore, it gives an 
overview of current corporate carbon pricing instruments.
To better reflect the plethora of topics being considered in the climate dialogue, the report also analyzes 
 competitiveness and carbon leakage, and their impact on the development of carbon pricing instruments. The 
task team responsible for this report intends to select new relevant topics to be explored in future editions. 
These topics could include, for example, the effectiveness of existing and emerging carbon pricing instruments, 
and how to measure it. 
Finally, this year’s report gives the audience a forward-looking assessment of the advantages of  international 
cooperation in reaching stringent global mitigation targets. A review of existing modeling work provides 
a qualitative and quantitative assessment of cost saving potentials and the magnitude of financial flows 
 inherent to international cooperation aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions to a level consistent 
with the  2°C climate stabilization goal.
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W ith the countdown on to the Paris climate change conference, there is clear evidence of 
growing momentum to put a price on carbon. The 
growth of carbon pricing around the world has been 
substantial. Since January 2012, the number of carbon 
pricing instruments already implemented or scheduled 
for implementation has almost doubled, jumping from 
20 to 38. Moreover, the share of emissions covered by 
carbon pricing has increased threefold over the last 
 decade.
Currently, about 40 national jurisdictions and over 
20 cities, states, and regions—representing almost a 
 quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—are 
putting a price on carbon (Figure 1).  Together, carbon 
pricing instruments cover about half of the emissions in 
these jurisdictions, which translates to about 7 gigatons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) or about 12 percent 
of global emissions (see Figure 2). 
To date, China and the United States are the two 
countries with the largest volume of emissions covered 
by carbon pricing instruments. In China carbon  pricing 
instruments cover 1 GtCO2e, while in the  United 
States they cover 0.5 GtCO2e. China has announced its 
intention to move to a national emissions trading system 
(ETS). It currently has seven pilot ETSs, which  combined 
form the largest national carbon pricing initiative in 
the world in terms of volume. The European Union 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which covers 
2 GtCO2e of emissions, remains the single largest 
international carbon pricing instrument. 
So far this year, the Republic of Korea launched 
an ETS, and California and Québec’s cap-and-trade 
programs expanded their GHG emissions coverage 
from about 35 to 85 percent by including transport fuel. 
Also, Ontario announced its intention to implement 
an ETS linked to California and Québec’s programs. A 
major structural reform in the EU ETS was approved 
for implementation starting in 2019, and a proposal 
to revise the EU ETS after 2020 has been put forward. 
These changes should make the EU ETS more resilient 
to sudden changes in macroeconomic conditions and 
help ensure that the EU ETS enables cost-effective 
emission reductions in the decade to come. 
The advances in 2015 follow on the heels of 2014 
milestones such as the implementation of two new 
subnational ETSs in Hubei and Chongqing (both 
Chinese jurisdictions), the implementation of carbon 
taxes in France and Mexico, and the adoption of new 
tax legislation in Chile. The year has also seen more 
companies using an internal price on carbon. 
Executive 
summary
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Overview of existing, emerging, and potential regional, national, and subnational carbon pricing instruments (ETS and tax)Figure 1 
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The combined value of the regional, national, and 
subnational carbon pricing instruments in 2015 is 
 estimated at just under US$50 billion globally, of which 
almost 70 percent (about US$34 billion) is attributed to 
ETSs and the remainder (about 30 percent) to carbon 
taxes. 
The existing carbon prices vary significantly—from 
less than US$1 per tCO2e to US$130 per tCO2e (see 
 Figure 3). The majority of emissions (85 percent) 
are priced at less than US$10 per tCO2e, which is 
considerably  lower than the price that economic  models 
have  estimated is needed to meet the 2°C climate 
 stabilization goal  recommended by scientists. 
Note: Nominal prices on August 1, 2015, shown for illustrative purpose only. The 
figures given in the Carbon Pricing Watch 201516 have been updated to August 1, 
2015. The differences with the Carbon Pricing Watch are due to the daily changes 
in prices and exchange rates. Prices are not necessarily comparable between 
carbon pricing instruments because of differences in the number of sectors covered 
and allocation methods applied, specific exemptions, and different compensation 
methods.
Prices in existing carbon pricing instrumentsFigure 3
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Executive summary
Carbon pricing is increasingly being used internally 
by firms as a tool to analyze business and investment 
strategy. Some of these carbon prices are substantially 
higher than current price levels in mandatory carbon 
pricing instruments. Internal carbon pricing is part of 
a risk management strategy to evaluate the current or 
potential impact of a mandated carbon price on business 
operations. It is also used as a means to identify and 
value cost savings and revenue opportunities in low-
carbon investments.
In a world of fragmented carbon pricing instruments, 
the potential impact of carbon pricing on the international 
competitiveness of some domestic industrial sectors has 
been a  concern. The risk of carbon leakage is real as long 
as carbon price signals are strong and the stringency of 
climate policies differs significantly across jurisdictions. 
However, the report finds, based on available 
research, that carbon leakage—the phenomenon of 
companies moving their production and/or redirecting 
their investments to other jurisdictions where emissions 
costs are lower, thereby increasing emissions there—has 
not materialized on a significant scale. This risk tends to 
only affect a limited number of exposed sectors, namely 
those that are both emissions- and trade intensive. This 
risk can be effectively managed through policy design 
components, such as free allocations, exemptions, 
rebates and border adjustment measures, as well as 
specific complementary measures, for example, financial 
assistance. 
The risk of carbon leakage declines as more countries 
take concrete actions to prevent climate change. 
International cooperation through carbon pricing 
instruments and climate finance can help redress the 
existing asymmetry in carbon pricing signals, reduce 
concerns about their impact on competitiveness, and 
eliminate the need for protection of firms. Under these 
circumstances, carbon prices can be used to enhance 
the performance of economies—specifically benefiting 
innovative, low-carbon firms, and promoting the 
technical upgrade or exit of the least efficient firms in 
emissions-intensive industries. This would improve the 
overall efficiency of the economy.
In addition to reducing the risk of carbon leakage, 
cooperation between countries can significantly reduce 
the overall cost of achieving a 2°C climate stabilization 
goal compared to domestic actions alone, as countries 
have more flexibility in choosing who undertakes 
emission reductions, and who pays for them. Moreover, 
such cooperation could drive low-carbon growth in 
lower-income countries, some of which might lack the 
resources to modernize their economies, create jobs in 
low-carbon sectors, or reduce poverty in a sustainable 
manner. Through international cooperation, the global 
costs associated with a given emission reduction target 
can be lowered or a larger mitigation target can be 
achieved at a given cost, and development gaps can be 
narrowed.
According to estimates from economic models, 
financial transfers through cooperation could reach 
up to US$100–400 billion annually by 2030, possibly 
increasing to over $2 trillion dollars by 2050. The size 
of the transfers will be beyond the level of public sector 
spending, and will need to be channeled through a blend 
of instruments. These include carbon pricing instruments 
such as ETSs, carbon taxes, offsets and a combination 
thereof and linkages between them, as well as innovative 
hybrid instruments, such as variations of results-based 
climate finance. Climate finance and carbon pricing 
instruments will be essential in leveraging these financial 
transfers and enabling cooperation to mitigate climate 
change.
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section 1
1 Introduction
1 Temperature record keeping began in 1880 (source: NOAA National Climatic Data Center, Global Analysis - Annual 2014, accessed April 28, 2015, https://
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/2014/13).
2 World Bank, Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal, 2014. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The UNEP says that the median emission level required for this target is 42 GtCO2e in 2030 and 22 GtCO2e in 2050. Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 
2014. According to the IPCC, global emissions need to be reduced by 40–70% in 2050, compared to 2010 levels, in order to have a likely chance to keep the 
temperature change below 2°C. Source: IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change – Summary for Policy Makers, 2014. 
5 The additional investment is relative to the US$318 trillion that is expected to be invested in a business-as-usual scenario. Source: International Energy Agency, 
Energy Technology Perspectives 2015, 2015. 
6 UNEP, Climate commitments of subnational actors and business: A quantitative assessment of their emission reduction impact, 2015. 
7 IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change - Summary for Policy Makers, 2014. 
T he year 2014 proved to be the warmest year since record keeping began1 and temperatures 
are now 0.8°C above pre-industrial levels.2 From heat 
and  precipitation to drought and cyclone activity, the 
 frequency of extreme weather events has increased,3 with 
damaging effects on settlements, crops, food,  water, 
and energy security. The risks this poses to  people’s lives 
and well-being are expected to be even higher if the 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trend  remains 
unchecked. Experts agree that the most severe climate 
impacts can be avoided if the mean  global temperature 
rise is lower than 2°C.
Keeping this goal within reach requires significant 
cuts in emissions of all GHGs. Compared with the 
2012 overall level of 54 gigatons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (GtCO2e), GHG emissions need to be cut 
by 32 GtCO2e by 2050.
4 The international community 
faces a huge challenge in raising the ambition expressed 
by countries so far to the level actually needed to avoid 
dangerous climate change. 
Over the next 35 years, approximately US$40  trillion 
of additional investment will be needed to transition 
to a global, low-carbon energy system.5 Beyond the 
official climate negotiations under the United Nations 
 Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), support 
for the necessary changes is coming from a  variety 
of actors,6 public and private sector finance  playing 
an  increasingly important role. Current  financial 
flows  associated with climate change mitigation and 
 adaptation amount to about US$343–385 billion/year 
globally, with most of this going to mitigation efforts.7 
However, to stabilize the climate, these resources need 
to be scaled up and investment patterns need to change. 
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There is a growing consensus among both govern-
ments and businesses on the fundamental role of  carbon 
pricing in the transition to a decarbonized economy. 
Placing an adequate price on GHG emissions helps 
 mobilize the financial investments required to support 
diverse actions, such as fuel switching from coal to 
 natural gas, renewable energy deployment, the adoption 
of energy efficiency measures and the use of low-carbon 
technologies in industry.
For governments, carbon pricing is an instrument 
to achieve emissions mitigation and also a source of 
 revenue, which is particularly important in the  current 
 economic environment of budgetary constraints. 
 Businesses use internal carbon pricing to evaluate the 
impact of mandatory carbon prices on their operations 
and as a tool to  identify potential cost savings and 
revenue  opportunities. Finally, long-term investors use 
carbon pricing to analyze the potential impact of climate 
change policies on their investment portfolios, allowing 
them to reassess investment strategies and reallocate 
capital toward low-carbon or climate-safe activities. 
Over the past year, new carbon pricing  instruments 
have been launched, and existing ones have been  evolving 
in response to the lessons learned from  operational 
 experience. These existing and new  instruments, as well as 
carbon pricing trends, are discussed in section 2. For the 
purpose of this report, carbon pricing refers to  initiatives 
that put an explicit price8 on GHG emissions. These 
initiatives include not only emissions trading  systems 
(ETSs), carbon taxes, offset mechanisms, and  results-
based finance (RBF), but also internal  carbon prices set 
by companies. Bearing in mind this scope,  other policies 
that implicitly price GHG  emissions—such as the 
removal of fossil fuel subsidies, energy  taxation, support 
for renewable energy, and energy efficiency  certificate 
trading – are not included. 
The carbon prices observed in these instruments 
vary significantly, from less than US$1/tCO2e to 
$US130/tCO2e. The majority of emissions (85 percent) 
are priced at less than US$10/tCO2e, which is 
considerably lower than the price that economic models 
have estimated is needed to meet the 2°C climate 
stabilization goal recommended by scientists. As carbon 
pricing is not implemented uniformly around the world, 
one of the key issues facing the affected industries is 
carbon leakage—the situation where production and 
associated emissions shift to jurisdictions that do not 
have equivalent policies in place. Section 3 examines 
this issue and suggests policy provisions that could 
alleviate it.
Finally, to optimize the emission reductions that 
 carbon pricing and other policy instruments can  deliver, 
cooperation is needed on all levels. Section 4 focuses on 
the rationale and potential economic gains of a joint 
mitigation effort. The report concludes by examining 
carbon pricing instruments and their crucial role in 
mobilizing the resources needed to achieve cost savings 
through international cooperation.   
8 In other words, a price expressed as a value per ton of CO2. 
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1  Introduction
» Climate change poses great dangers to us all.  
This means that we need to limit harmful greenhouse gas 
emissions effectively. Economic incentives are a good way 
to achieve this goal. Carbon pricing makes investments 
in low-carbon or carbon-free technologies attractive and 
ensures that fossil fuels are used efficiently. This helps us 
to adhere to our common two-degree climate goal. […] 
 
Our country’s positive economic development shows  
that technological progress and growth can go hand 
in hand with climate protection. […] The emission of 
harmful greenhouse gases must come at a price. This is 
the only way that we will make any tangible progress on 
climate protection. And it is the only way to ensure that 
we will not have to pay a far higher price in the end. 
 
Fortunately, many governments and companies  
are already using carbon-pricing instruments. Our  
hope is that all countries will perceive the opportunities  
that economically efficient and low-carbon development 
offers them. «
Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany
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section 2
2.1
OVERVIEW, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 
AND EMERGING TRENDS 
2.1.1 
Global overview of  
carbon pricing instruments
A s of August 31, 2015, 39 national and 23 sub national jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon through 
ETSs and taxes (Box 1 and Figure 4). Together, these car-
bon pricing instruments cover some 7 GtCO2e, about 
12 percent of the annual global GHG emissions.9 This 
represents significant progress: the number of carbon 
pricing instruments has expanded by 90 percent since 
2012. More specifically, since January 1, 2012, the 
number of carbon pricing instruments implemented 
and scheduled has increased from 20 to 38. In addition, 
the share of global emissions under a carbon pricing in-
strument has increased threefold over the past decade 
(Figure 5).10 
Figure 5 shows three distinct periods since the intro-
duction of carbon pricing instruments: (i) the period 
1990-2005, which was dominated by early movers intro-
ducing carbon taxes; (ii) the period 2005-11, which saw 
the start of the Kyoto Protocol, and a rapid expansion 
in the coverage of GHG emissions, largely because of 
the implementation of the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS);11 and (iii) the period from 
2012 to the present day, which is mainly defined by the 
decline in the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and 
the emergence of new, national and subnational, carbon 
pricing instruments in both developed and developing 
economies. 
2 Existing and emerging  
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9 The EU ETS operates in the 28 EU member states and the other three members of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway).
10 These numbers are revised on a regular basis to reflect updated figures on GHG emissions in each jurisdiction, changes in the design and coverage of existing 
carbon pricing instruments, the inclusion of new instruments, and the availability of new data. Thus, these figures and the ones from previous State and trends of 
carbon pricing reports are not necessarily comparable.
11 In 2005, carbon pricing instruments covered 4 percent of annual global GHG emissions; in 2015, this figure stands at 12 percent. 
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12 See footnote 15 for the underlying calculation related to the value of the carbon pricing instruments implemented.
21
2  Existing and emerging carbon pricing instruments around the world
 ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation
 Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation
 ETS or carbon tax under consideration
 ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled
 ETS implemented or scheduled, tax under consideration
 Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration
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The circles represent subnational jurisdictions. The circles are not  representative of the size of the carbon pricing 
instrument, but show the subnational regions (large circles) and cities (small circles).
Note: RGGI = Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Carbon pricing instruments are considered “scheduled for 
implementation” once they have been formally adopted through legislation and have an official, planned start date. 
Instruments implemented or scheduled for implementation: National ETSs: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. 
National carbon taxes: Chile, Japan, Mexico, and South Africa. Both ETSs and carbon taxes: Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. Subnational ETSs: Alberta, Beijing, California, Chongqing, Connecticut, Delaware, Guangdong, Hubei, 
Kyoto, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Québec, Rhode Island, Saitama, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Tianjin, Tokyo, and Vermont. Subnational carbon tax: British Columbia.
Instruments under consideration: National ETS or carbon tax: Brazil, China, Japan (ETS), Mexico (ETS), the 
Republic of Korea (carbon tax), Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine. Subnational ETS or carbon tax: Manitoba, Ontario, 
Oregon, Rio de Janeiro, São Paolo, Taiwan, and Washington State.
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Regional, national, and subnational carbon pricing instruments already implemented or scheduled for implementation: 
share of global GHG emissions covered
Figure 5
Note: Only the introduction or removal of an ETS or carbon tax is shown. Emissions are given as a share of global GHG emissions in 2012. Annual changes in global, regional, 
national, and subnational GHG emissions are not shown in the graph. Data on the coverage of the city-level Kyoto ETS are not accessible; its coverage is therefore shown as zero.
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 Prices currently range from about US$1 to 
US$130/tCO2e (Figure 6) and have shown  little 
 movement in absolute terms over the past year.13  Despite 
this  relatively wide range, 99 percent of  emissions are 
priced at less than US$30/tCO2e and 85 percent are 
priced at less than US$10/tCO2e (Figure 7). Most 
 scenario  analyses indicate a global average carbon 
price of between US$80/tCO2e and US$120/tCO2e 
in 2030 would be consistent with the goal of limiting 
the  global warming to 2°C.14 While these carbon prices, 
 calculated by large-scale climate-economy models, do 
not  necessarily have to be an explicit carbon tax rate or 
allowance price, the difference between this range and 
the prices currently observed gives an indication of the 
scale of the challenge lying ahead.
The global value of the regional, national, and 
 sub national carbon pricing instruments in 2015 is 
 estimated at just under US$50 billion.15 
2  Existing and emerging carbon pricing instruments around the world
Note: Nominal prices on August 1, 2015, shown for illustrative purpose only. The 
figures given in the Carbon Pricing Watch 201516 have been updated to August 1, 
2015. The differences with the Carbon Pricing Watch are due to the daily changes 
in prices and exchange rates. Prices are not necessarily comparable between 
carbon pricing instruments because of differences in the number of sectors covered 
and allocation methods applied, specific exemptions, and different compensation 
methods.
Prices in existing carbon pricing instrumentsFigure 6
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Carbon price and emissions coverage of existing carbon pricing instruments Figure 7
13 An OECD analysis calculated a total effective tax rate on CO2 by considering explicit carbon taxes and implicit carbon tax rates from specific energy taxes, as these 
are economically similar. On average, the total effective tax rate in an OECD country in 2012 is €164/tCO2 for oil products used in road transport, €24/tCO2 for oil 
products used for heating and process use, and €5/tCO2 for coal and peat used in heating and process use. Source: OECD, Taxing Energy Use, 2015. 
14 Leon Clarke, Kejun Jiang, Keigo Akimoto, Mustafa Babiker, Geoffrey Blanford, Karen Fisher-Vanden, Jean-Charles Hourcade, Volker Krey, Elmar Kriegler, Andreas 
Loschel, David McCollum, Sergey Paltsev, Steven Rose, Priyadarshi R. Shukla, Massimo Tavoni, Bob van der Zwaan and Detlef P. van Vuuren, “Assessing Transfor-
mation Pathways,” in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2014; IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2014. 
15 The total value of the ETS markets is estimated by multiplying each ETS’s annual allowance volume for 2015, or for the latest year that data are available, with the 
allowance price on April 1, 2015. The total value for carbon taxes is derived from official government budgets for 2015. Where the allowance volume (for an ETS) 
or budget information (for a carbon tax) is unavailable, the value of the carbon pricing instrument is calculated by multiplying the GHG emissions covered with the 
nominal carbon price on April 1, 2015. The State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014 report reported a total value US$32 billion for only the ETSs. The value of 
global ETSs as of April 1, 2015, was US$34 billion—a slight increase with respect to 2014—mainly because of the launch of the Republic of Korea’s ETS and the 
expansion of GHG emissions coverage in the California and Québec ETSs, and despite the repeal of Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism in July 2014. The total 
value of carbon taxes around the world is about US$14 billion. There was no need to update the values presented in the Carbon Pricing Watch 2015 to August 1, 
2015 because no new carbon pricing instruments have been implemented nor have any changes occurred in the existing instruments since the release of that brief 
in May 2015. Moreover, daily changes in prices and exchange rates over a 4-month period cannot be used as an indicator of the evolution of global carbon pricing 
instruments. 
16 Kossoy, Alexandre; Peszko, Grzegorz; Oppermann, Klaus; Prytz, Nicolai; Gilbert, Alyssa; Klein, Noemie; Lam, Long; Wong, Lindee. 2015. Carbon Pricing Watch 2015.
Washington, DC. World Bank.
40
60
70
30
10
50
20
0
130
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Emissions 
covered  
[MtCO2e]
…
…
…
…
C
ar
bo
n 
pr
ic
e 
[U
S
$
/t
C
O
2
e]
Switzerland carbon tax
Sweden carbon tax
Finland carbon tax
Tokyo CaT
UK carbon price floor
Denmark carbon tax
BC carbon tax
Ireland carbon tax
Slovenia carbon tax
France carbon tax
Québec CaT
California CaT
Alberta SGER
Norway carbon tax
Switzerland ETS
Korea ETS
Poland carbon tax
Japan carbon tax
Kazakhstan ETS
EU ETS
Iceland carbon tax
Beijing Pilot ETS
RGGI
Portugal carbon tax
Shenzhen Pilot ETS
New Zealand ETS
Hubei Pilot ETS
Latvia carbon tax
Tianjin Pilot ETS
Guangdong Pilot ETS
Chongqing Pilot ETS
Shanghai Pilot ETS
Estonia carbon tax
Mexico carbon tax
Note: The carbon tax rate applied in Mexico, Finland, and Norway varies with the fossil fuel type and use. The graph shows the 
average carbon tax rate weighted by the amount of emissions covered at the different tax rates in those jurisdictions. Carbon tax ETS  
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2.1.2
Recent developments and  
emerging trends 
This report monitors developments in carbon  pricing 
during the period 2014–1517 and highlights the  sustained 
interest of governments and the growing engagement of 
the private sector. As further experience is gained with 
carbon pricing, new instruments are being designed 
and existing ones adjusted so as to reflect the lessons 
learned over the past decade. This section explores these 
 emerging trends and policy design lessons. 
New instruments continue to emerge 
Six  jurisdictions implemented new carbon pricing 
 instruments in the 2014–15 period covered by this 
 report. These instruments include:
 – In 2014: 
 – ETSs in Hubei and Chongqing  
(both located in China)
 – Carbon taxes in France and Mexico18 
 – In 2015: 
 – ETS in the Republic of Korea
 – Carbon tax in Portugal. 
In addition, Chile passed legislation for a carbon tax 
to be introduced in 2017, and Taiwan and Ontario 
 announced that they would be adopting an ETS in the 
future. As planned, on January 1, 2015, California and 
Québec expanded the GHG coverage of their Cap-and-
Trade programs to include transport fuels. 
In 2014, China and the United States entered into 
one of the most significant bilateral agreements to date 
on climate change. As part of this agreement between 
the world’s two largest emitters, both have committed to 
GHG emission reduction targets. China and the United 
States are also the two countries with the largest volume 
of emissions covered under carbon pricing instruments. 
If each country’s subnational carbon pricing instruments 
are added up, carbon pricing covers a GHG emissions 
volume of about 1 GtCO2e in China and 0.5 GtCO2e 
in the United States.19 The United States intends to meet 
its emission reduction target partly through the United 
States Environmental Agency’s (US EPA) Clean Power 
Plan, which was finalized in August 2015. 
Meanwhile, discussions continue on the role of 
 carbon pricing in emission mitigation on a national 
or regional scale. Australia replaced its Carbon  Pricing 
Mechanism with the Direct Action Plan, which  retains 
offsetting, but does not impose a cap on GHG  emissions. 
 Oregon, Ontario, and Washington State are  considering 
the  implementation of an ETS, following the lead 
of  neighboring states that have implemented carbon 
 pricing  instruments—British Columbia,  California, 
Québec, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) states.20  
17 This report covers the period from January 1, 2014 to August 1, 2015.
18 For further details on the French and Mexican carbon taxes, please refer to World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014, May 2014. 
19 The volume of GHG emissions covered is not equivalent to the ETS’s allowance volume (i.e., the size of the cap). The size of the cap is used to calculate the value 
of an ETS.
20 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the first market-based regulatory program in the United States to reduce GHG emissions. It is a cooperative 
effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce 
CO2 emissions from the power sector.
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» China and the United States 
are the two countries  
with the largest volume of 
emissions covered under  
carbon pricing instruments. «
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Support for carbon pricing growing in 
 public and private sectors A number of 
 government leaders and policy makers in both developed 
and developing economies continue to advocate the 
use of carbon pricing to achieve a global decarbonized 
economy.21 Business leaders are also increasingly engaging 
with this topic and several have stated their support for 
carbon pricing. For example, over 1,000 investors and 
companies signed the “Put a Price on Carbon Statement”.22 
Moreover, several initiatives have been launched 
by alliances such as the Carbon Pricing Leadership 
 Coalition, to jointly make a business case for carbon 
pricing and formulate key principles for successful policy 
design and implementation.23 
The choice of carbon pricing instrument 
is based on national circumstances and 
 political realities After more than a decade of 
 experience with carbon pricing, the long-running debate 
over the superiority of an ETS or tax has been replaced 
by a pragmatic dialogue. In fact, what is the most suitable 
instrument depends on the specific circumstances and 
context of a given  jurisdiction, and the instrument’s 
policy objectives should be aligned with the broader 
national economic priorities and institutional capacities. 
An ETS and a carbon tax are increasingly being used 
in  complementary ways, features of both instruments 
 often being combined to form hybrid  approaches.24 The 
 differences and commonalities of ETSs and carbon taxes 
are  discussed further in Box 2. 
Carbon pricing is only one instrument in a range 
of approaches that need to be mobilized for emissions 
 mitigation. Other policy instruments, such as the 
 removal of fossil fuel subsidies, infrastructure invest-
ments in transport and energy, renewable energy port-
folio standards, and energy efficiency standards, also 
have an important role to play in achieving emission 
 reductions. Carbon pricing and these complementary 
policy  instruments need to operate in tandem to address 
the urgency and scale of the climate change mitigation 
challenge.   
21 The World Bank Group is supporting these developments with catalytic initiatives, among others, the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC) and the 
 Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR).
22 World Bank, We Support Putting a Price on Carbon, 2014.
23 Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, accessed June 11, 2015, http://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/. 
24 Generally ETSs and carbon taxes cover different sectors; in the EU, for example, carbon taxes mostly apply to sectors not covered by the EU ETS.
Emissions trading systems and carbon taxesBox 2 
While both an ETS and a carbon tax can achieve cost-effective and efficient emission reductions, these two 
instruments differ significantly. One of their key differences is the level of uncertainty associated with the 
carbon price and emission reductions that will be achieved. On the one hand, a carbon tax provides more 
certainty as to the price level, as the latter is set by the government, although this is subject to regulatory 
risk. On the other hand, the price signal given by an ETS arises from a restriction on the quantity of emission 
allowances and economic cycles. Price certainty is desirable because investment in low- carbon technology 
requires confidence in the existence of a sufficiently high, long-term carbon price. On the other hand, it is 
almost certain that an ETS will deliver emission reductions, as this is achieved by controlling the volume 
of allowances through the cap, while a tax is not directly related to an emission reduction target. Taxes are 
generally set by modeling the cost of reducing emissions up to a certain target. Any inaccuracies in the 
model used will result in actual emission reductions that are different from the emission reductions target. 
27
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However, the degree of certainty in meeting environmental targets or strengthening the price signal can be 
increased through dynamic adjustments to changing circumstances. For example, tax rates can be altered to 
reflect the level of progress in emission reductions, while the supply of emission allowances can be modified 
to influence prices.  
 
An ETS and a carbon tax also differ in administrative complexity. A carbon tax is generally easier to  implement, 
as it can build on existing taxation infrastructure, for example, through the expansion of an energy taxation 
policy. The operation of a carbon tax is also relatively simple, as it only requires emissions  monitoring and 
reporting. However, an administrative burden arises from the iterative approach often used to set tax rates. 
These revisions may also involve changes in the scope of the carbon tax or its integration into a broader 
energy tax, thereby creating uncertainty for low-carbon investments. The implementation of an ETS is more 
complicated because it requires the creation of a new commodity (emission allowances), the allocation of 
these emission allowances, and the establishment of a market for trading. New institutions may also have 
to be set up, further adding to complexity and costs. However, the administrative costs are generally low in 
relation to the value of the carbon pricing instrument. 
Often, the choice of instrument is not only motivated by the above characteristics, but also by  specific 
 national circumstances. For example, the EU chose an ETS rather than a carbon tax partly because the 
EU  legislative remit simply does not cover fiscal policies such as carbon taxation.25 South Africa opted for 
a carbon tax because of the concentrated nature of its energy sector-marked by a small number of market 
participants and small trading volumes. This would have resulted in an illiquid and potentially skewed market, 
making it hard to operate an efficient ETS and thereby defeating one of the main purposes for establishing an 
ETS.26 Another reason South Africa chose a carbon tax over an ETS is that this instrument could be built on 
the existing infrastructure used for other taxes.27 
While jurisdictions commonly start to price carbon by introducing an ETS or carbon tax, these two 
 instruments are increasingly being deployed together. A carbon tax may also be used as a transitional 
instrument toward an ETS. Moreover, an ETS and a carbon tax can be used to target emission reductions in 
different sectors of one jurisdiction. The carbon taxes in France, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden, for instance, 
are applicable to  selected, non-EU ETS sectors. In some cases, compatibility of future instruments is 
considered. For example, the  implementation of Chile’s tax and MRV system will be ETS compatible to facilitate 
the possible implemen tation of an ETS in the future.  
Finally, hybrid instruments and tax instruments that also permit the use of offsets actually combine some 
of the features of ETSs and taxes. For example, the California Cap-and-Trade Program applies an auction 
reserve price and a soft price ceiling to provide both liable entities and investors with a degree of price 
certainty. Similarly, the use of offsets in Mexico’s carbon tax and, potentially, in South Africa’s proposed carbon 
tax provides liable entities with flexible mechanisms for compliance.   
25 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision Making (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).
26 National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Carbon Tax Policy Paper: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Facilitating the Transition to a Green Economy, 
May 2013.
27 Ibid.
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Carbon pricing instruments are fine-tuned, 
incorporating lessons learned One key 
 feature of the latest instruments is a well-designed price 
 stabilization measure, such as the floor price and soft 
ceiling price in the California Cap-and-Trade Program 
and the reserve of allowances in the Republic of Korea’s 
ETS. These price stabilization measures are designed to 
facilitate emission reductions in a cost-effective manner. 
Predictability of carbon prices is essential to reducing 
the investment risk of low-carbon technologies. Another 
way to strengthen the carbon price signal is by reducing 
market volatility through market stabilization measures. 
In the EU ETS, the large surplus of emission  allowances 
has undermined the carbon price signal, and the EU 
addressed this by the implementation of backloading in 
2014 and the market stability reserve (MSR), which is 
expected to come into force in 2019.  
Industry protection provisions evolve to 
avoid carbon leakage Policymakers continue to 
reduce the risk of carbon leakage and assist emissions- 
intensive, trade-exposed industry sectors in remaining 
internationally competitive through the free allocation 
of emission allowances and other methods. In 2014, 
the EU finalized the list of industries that will receive 
additional free allowances for the EU ETS in the  period 
2015–19. Under the Republic of Korea’s ETS, all 
 allowances will be given out free of charge during the 
first phase, reflecting concerns about carbon leakage and 
 international competitiveness. China’s national ETS will 
also distribute allocations for free. Another method 
to reduce the risk of carbon leakage is through border 
 carbon adjustments, a measure bearing resemblance 
to the equal treatment of emissions associated with 
 electricity  importers and generators in the California 
Cap-and-Trade Program. A more thorough analysis of 
the  impacts of carbon pricing on carbon leakage and 
 industrial  competitiveness is presented in section 3.  
The environment and social welfare are 
among beneficiaries of carbon pricing 
 revenue Total government revenue derived from ETS 
allowance auctions and carbon taxes in 2014 is estimated 
at over US$15 billion (Box 3). This revenue is used in 
 diverse ways, for example, to lower taxes, provide  additional 
payments to citizens, or finance emission reduction 
activities or other projects. For instance, some ETS 
 revenue in Guangdong will be channeled to a low- 
carbon development fund that will support energy 
 savings and emission reductions,28 while a portion of 
the post-2020 revenue from the EU ETS will finance 
an energy  system modernization fund and a low carbon 
innovation fund.29 Revenue from Switzerland’s carbon 
tax is returned to the country’s citizens through lower 
health insurance payments and to business via the  social 
 security  contributions.30 The proposed Oregon ETS, 
which is currently under debate in the State’s  legislature, 
intends to return the revenue collected to Oregon’s 
 citizens in the form of a “dividend” payment.  
28 Sun Yat-sen University, Research Center of Low Carbon Technology and Economy and ICIS China, Guangdong Pilot Emissions Trading Scheme Report  
(2013-2014), March 2015.
29 European Council, Cover Note from General Secretariat of the Council of Delegations to Delegations: European Council (23 and 24 October 2014)  
% Conclusions, October 24, 2014.
30 Switzerland Federal Office of the Environment, Redistribution of CO2 tax, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/13877/14510/14749/
index.html?lang=fr.
29
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31 Authors’ calculations, based on auction revenue reports of the different ETSs, sales of allowances from the EU ETS’ fund for demonstration projects in innovative 
low-carbon technologies (NER300), payments into Alberta’s Climate Change and Management Fund, and the annual budget of governments with carbon taxes in 
place. The total government revenue in 2014 is calculated at US$16 billion.
Carbon taxes and ETSs as tools to support public budgetBox 3 
It is estimated that in 2014 over US$15 billion31 in government revenue was raised through carbon taxes and 
ETS sales. About US$5 billion, or a third of total government revenue, was derived from the sale of emission 
allowances under ETSs, mostly through auctions, the EU ETS accounting for almost US$4 billion. The total 
revenue in 2014 raised through carbon taxes implemented around the world is estimated at over US$10 billion, 
the United Kingdom accounting for about a fifth of the total amount, followed by Japan, Finland, Norway, and 
British Columbia. These figures highlight the potential to generate significant revenue streams through these 
means. The rise in carbon prices that is necessary to limit the global temperature increase to 2°C would, in 
turn, further increase revenues. 
Carbon pricing revenues are used in various ways, for example: 
 – RGGI has already invested over US$1 billion, or more than 70 percent of its 2008–13 ETS revenue, in 
projects on energy efficiency, renewable energy and GHG abatement, and support for household energy 
bills.32 Almost all remaining revenue has been reserved for future projects in those same areas.
 – Total payments of GHG emitters into Alberta’s Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund 
have grown to CAN$578 million (US$443 million) in the 2007–14 compliance periods. They must be 
 dedicated to reducing emissions of specified gases or improving the province’s ability to adapt to climate 
change. The Climate Change and Emissions Management Corporation, using competitive processes, has 
funded 109 projects for a total of CAN$350 million (US$268 million). These projects represent a total 
value of over CAN$2.2 billion (US$1.7 billion), if private sector investments are also taken into account.
 – The EU ETS member states have indicated that they will use around €3 billion (US$3.3 billion) of their 
2013 auction revenues, or 80 percent, for energy- and climate-related projects.33 Additionally, the EU has 
used the revenue derived from the sale of 300 million allowances to set up a dedicated fund of €2.1 billion 
(US$2.3 billion) to support demonstration projects on innovative low-carbon technologies.
 – British Columbia is required by law to recycle all carbon tax revenues through tax reductions. The revenue 
is returned through tax cuts in personal and corporate income tax and tax credits. In the tax year 2013/14, 
the total revenue recycling measures amounted to CAN$1,232 million (US$944 million) while total carbon 
tax revenue amounted to CAN$1,222 million (US$937 million), meaning the carbon tax was revenue- 
negative.34 In fact, it has been revenue-negative since its introduction in 2008 and is expected to remain so.
 – Switzerland redistributes about two thirds of its annual carbon tax revenue of about CHF800 million 
(US$831 million) to businesses and the public.35 In 2014, about CHF180 million (US$187 million) 
was redistributed to the employers by reducing their social security contribution, and CHF297 million 
(US$309 million) went to the public by lowering the health insurance premium. A third of the revenue 
(maximum of CHF300 million (US$312 million) goes into an energy refurbishment fund for buildings. 
Finally, another CHF25 million (US$26 million) goes into a low-carbon technology fund. The revenues do 
not feed into the federal budget. 
Beyond raising revenues, carbon taxes offer other fiscal advantages. Placing a carbon tax on the carbon con-
tent of fuels may be administratively easy relative to some other taxes, in particular where the tax administration 
can be built on existing excise taxes. Furthermore, carbon emissions are a good tax base, as carbon sources 
are concentrated and difficult to evade. For example, in Sweden, which has had a carbon tax since 1992, tax 
evasion is less than 1 percent for carbon, much less than it is for the value added tax.36 
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INDCs give some insights into countries’ 
plans and actions on carbon pricing At 
the international level, the role of carbon pricing 
post-2020 is being discussed ahead of the December 
2015 Paris  climate change conference (21st session of 
the  Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC—
COP 21—and 11th session of the Conference of the 
 Parties  serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto  Protocol—CMP 11). The Intended Nationally 
 Determined  Contributions (INDCs) indicate national 
 climate  policy  objectives. Some INDCs also shed light 
on the envisaged use of  domestic and  international 
carbon pricing instruments toward meeting  post-
2020  emission reduction targets (see section 2.2.1). As 
 discussed in  section 4,  cooperation between countries 
through  carbon pricing instruments and climate finance 
is the key to ensuring that  mitigation is optimized and 
achieved cost- effectively.
2.2
INTERNATIONAL CARBON  
PRICING INSTRUMENTS 
2.2.1 
International carbon pricing 
under the UNFCCC 
Status of the international post-2020 
 climate negotiations A new post-2020 agreement 
is expected to be reached at the Paris climate change 
 conference to be held in December 2015. The details 
of this agreement are under negotiation, and, as of July 
2015, two options were being considered for the role of 
carbon markets.37 The first option includes provisions 
in the proposed text for market mechanisms, such as 
 descriptions of the purpose of such a mechanism, while 
the second option does not. Prior to COP 21, further 
discussions on the negotiating text will take place. 
Countries were invited to communicate to the 
 UNFCCC their INDCs in advance of COP 21. As of 
August 31, 2015, 57 Parties—representing  approximately 
61 percent of global GHG emissions—had submitted 
their INDCs (Figure 8). According to some analysts, 
further discussions will be needed to make the INDCs 
consistent with the 2°C pathway.38 
Several INDCs explicitly indicate that carbon 
 pricing will be an element of their mitigation strategy. 
For example, China, Norway, and Iceland highlighted 
that an ETS will play a role in their post-2020 emission 
reductions. Other countries, such as the Republic of 
 Korea and Switzerland, stated their intention to use 
inter national credits to meet their targets. By contrast, 
some INDCs—including those of Andorra, the EU, 
Gabon, the Marshall Islands, and the United States—
explicitly rule out the use of international credits. How-
ever, INDCs do not provide a comprehensive overview 
of how carbon pricing will be used. For instance, the 
EU’s INDC does not discuss the role of its ETS but, 
in another official communication, the EU ETS is 
 identified as the main instrument to deliver emission 
 reductions.39 
32 RGGI, Investment of RGGI Proceeds Through 2013, April 2015.
33 European Commission, Press Release, EU gears up for 2030 with more emissions reductions, October 28, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
1202_en.htm.
34 British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan – 2015/16 to 2017/18 Carbon Tax Report and Plan, February 2015.
35 Switzerland Federal Office of the Environment, Redistribution of CO2 tax, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/13877/14510/14749/
index.html?lang=fr.
36 Marianne Fay, Stephane Hallegatte, Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Julie Rozenberg, Ulf Narloch, Tom Kerr, Decarbonizing Development: Three Steps to a Zero-Carbon 
Future. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2015.
37 UNFCCC, Informal Note ADP.2015.4., Scenario note on the tenth part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, July 24, 2015. 
38 Based on an analysis of the INDCs submitted as of May 14, 2015 and related policy statements on future energy trends. Source: IEA, Energy and Climate 
Change – World Energy Outlook Special Report, 2015.
39 European Council, European Council (October 23–24, 2014) Conclusions, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf.
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INDCs submittedFigure 8 
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Supply and demand outlook for Kyoto 
credits pre-2020 Lack of pre-2020 ambition under 
the UNFCCC remains an issue. The need for more 
 ambitious targets—for example, through mitigation 
of GHG other than carbon dioxide and further 
technical  examination of opportunities with high 
mitigation  potential and co-benefits—was reiterated 
at COP 20 in Lima.40 However, no specific action was 
agreed upon. With no sign of an increase in countries’ 
pre-2020 ambition, the declining market trend for 
Kyoto credits— Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)—continued in 
2014 and 2015 (Figure 10). 
To date, EU ETS installations have used 1.45 GtCO2e 
of CERs and ERUs41 to help them meet their  compliance 
obligations, or 90 percent of the total 1.6 GtCO2e  allowed 
under that system between 2008 and 2020. The latter 
figure represents about 60 percent of total  Kyoto credits 
issued so far.42 If this trend persists, EU ETS  installations 
are likely to exhaust their Kyoto  credit  quota in the next 
few years, leaving sellers of Kyoto  credits without their 
historically largest buyer. 
Outside the Kyoto Protocol, various instruments 
 create demand sources for CERs, such as  domestic 
 instruments accepting CERs, purchase programs, 
and voluntary cancellations of CERs. Mexico’s carbon 
tax and the Republic of Korea’s ETS allow the use of 
CERs issued by Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
 projects  located in the country,43 and so may South 
 Africa’s carbon tax, which is scheduled to be launched 
in 2016. CERs are currently priced significantly lower 
than the carbon tax or allowances under these  domestic 
instruments and they may therefore be attractive to 
compliance entities. CERs are also targeted by purchase 
programs, such as the RBF-based Carbon Initiative for 
Development (Ci-Dev), the Pilot Auction Facility for 
Methane and Climate Change Mitigation (PAF), and 
the Swedish Energy Agency purchase program.44 How-
ever, these demand sources are limited.45, 46 The total 
residual demand for Kyoto  credits between 2015 and 
2020 is therefore expected to be  minimal, resulting in a 
surplus of these credits. 
Credits yet to be issued will add to this surplus. The 
CDM pipeline is estimated to have the potential to issue 
about 6,600 MtCO2e between now and 2020, should 
the demand exist (Figure 9). This potential is based on 
the registered portfolio, without considering the effect of 
actual demand on the issuance levels. However, given the 
lack of demand, supply continues to head downwards 
(Figure 10), and a more realistic maximum potential 
 issuance till 2020 is about 750 MtCO2e (Figure 9).
47 
Yet even this figure remains significantly higher than 
 potential demand. The supply-demand imbalance is 
therefore not expected to tip, thereby preventing any 
 significant price recovery from the historically low prices. 
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40 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.20, Lima Call for Climate Action, February 2, 2015.
41 European Commission, Updated information on exchange and international credit use in the EU ETS, May 4, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/
news_2015050402_en.htm.
42 As of August 10, 2015, 2.48 billion CERs and ERUs had been issued. Source: UNFCCC, CDM Insights - Project Activities, accessed August 10, 2015, https://
cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights/index.html#iss; UNFCCC, CDM Insights: Programme of Activities, accessed August 10, 2015, https://cdm.
unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/PoA/index.html; UNFCCC, Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) Issued, June 30, 2015, http://ji.unfccc.int/statistics/2015/ERU_Issu-
ance_2015_06_30_1200.pdf.
43 CERs need to be voluntarily canceled before they can be swapped for Korean domestic credits that can be used for compliance under the Republic of Korea’s ETS. 
44 Carbon Initiative for Development, http://www.ci-dev.org/; Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation, http://www.pilotauctionfacility.org/; 
Swedish Energy Agency, The Swedish Energy Agency Is Supporting New Climate Change Mitigation Activities in Developing Countries, May 21, 2015, http://
www.energimyndigheten.se/en/About-us/Press-/Press-releases/The-Swedish-Energy-Agency-is-supporting-new-climate-change-mitigation-activities-in-devel-
oping-countries/.
45 The theoretical demand for offsets under the Republic of Korea’s ETS, based on the ceiling on offset use, is estimated at 187 million for 2015–17. However, only 1.9 
million had been issued as of April 2015, converted from canceled CERs, and it is estimated that only 20 million, coming from CDM projects in Korea, will become avail-
able by the end of 2017. Source: Thomson Reuters, Fragmentation of the Credit Markets, Carbon Market Monitor, June 10, 2015. There is no estimate of the potential 
demand under the Mexican and South African carbon taxes, but it is unlikely to be high enough to bridge the demand gap. As of August 31, 2015, about 4 MtCO2 had 
been voluntarily canceled, including a significant share for conversion to offsets for use under Korea’s ETS. Source: UNFCCC, CERs Cancelled to Date in the CDM Reg-
istry, accessed August 10, 2015, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Registry/vc_attest/index.html. PAF: the PAF has a capitalization target of US$100 million. The clearing price for 
the first auction was US$2.40/tCO2e. Assuming a similar price for future auctions, the PAF could purchase about 40 MtCO2e. Source: Pilot Auction Facility, http://www.
pilotauctionfacility.org. Ci-Dev: Ci-dev has a budget of US$95 million. Assuming a price of US$4–5/tCO2e, this would cover a purchase of 20–35 MtCO2e. 
46 Currently, most Chinese Certified Emission Reductions (CCERs) issued under the Chinese scheme are pre-CDM, that is, credits from registered CDM projects 
that were issued for emission reductions that happened before the projects were registered by the CDM Executive Board. The majority of the projects waiting 
to be registered are new projects that have not previously been registered as CDM projects. CDM projects can deregister and be registered as CCER projects, 
which represents an additional source of demand for the emission reductions generated by these projects. However, significant deregistration is only expected if 
the national ETS creates demand. Therefore, the impact of the CCER program on the CDM is not quantified at this stage and is expected to be limited. Source: 
Thomson Reuters, Fragmentation of the Credit Markets, Carbon Market Monitor, June 10, 2015.
47 Projects incur operational and regulatory costs to generate credits. Without a strong demand signal for these credits, project developers are expected to reduce 
or discontinue their mitigation activity in some of these projects. 
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In parallel, market participants continue to exit 
the market.48 Some of the experience gained and the 
infrastructure developed through the CDM have 
never theless benefited or been adapted by several new 
 instruments. For example, the CDM framework is being 
used as the basis for the domestic Chinese CER (CCER) 
scheme, CDM standardized baselines are being used in 
 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs),49 
and  multilateral development banks are starting to issue 
green bonds on the basis of CDM projects.50
Market and policy update ( mechanisms 
 under the Kyoto Protocol and new 
 mechanisms under the UNFCCC) The role of the 
CDM post-2020 remains uncertain. By the end of 2014, 
the CDM supported investments worth  approximately 
US$90 billion51 in GHG emission  reduction 
 projects in developing countries, or approximately 
13 percent of the total renewable energy investment 
in these countries.52 There is interest in ensuring the 
continuation of the CDM as an instrument to incentivize 
investments in mitigation, especially shortly after 2020, 
and facilitate cooperation on climate action.53  Market 
participants are investigating alternative uses of the 
CDM infrastructure beyond an offset mechanism, and 
potential integration of the CDM with new  market 
mechanisms. However, discussions on the future of 
 market mechanisms under the UNFCCC are likely to 
remain stalled while the 2015 Paris agreement,  including 
the role of carbon markets, is being  negotiated.  Table 1 
summarizes the state of the market, policy updates of 
the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol (CDM, Joint 
 Implementation or JI, and International  Emissions 
 Trading or IET), and new mechanisms under the 
 UNFCCC (New Market-based Mechanism or NMM, 
and the Framework for Various Approaches or FVA).  
48 For example, SGS withdrew from the validation and verification business in June 2014, Standard Bank closed its carbon desk in April 2015, and Bunge has 
announced it would close Climate Change Capital. 
49 For example, the Climate Change Adaptation-Oriented NAMA Option for the Rice Sector in the Philippines, Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley.
50 African Development Bank Group, The AfDB’s Annual Green Bond Newsletter, Issue 02, July 2015; Korea Eximbank, Green Bond Newsletter, January 2014.
51 This figure was calculated assuming an investment leverage factor of five, an average nominal CER price of US$11.77 over 2002–11 (weighted by the traded 
volume), and a total of 1.523 billion CERs issued between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2014. The actual value of the investment is likely to be higher as 
the figure above does not take into account the under-delivery of CERs that has been observed nor the projects that were executed considering the prospect of 
the CDM but that ended up not issuing CERs because of adverse market conditions. 
52 Total new renewable energy investments (excluding hydropower projects of >50 MW) in developing countries amounted to US$671 billion over the period 
2006–14. Source: REN21, Renewables 2015 Global Status Report, July 2015. 
53 UNFCCC, “What the CDM Can Offer the Emerging Market Mechanisms?” (presented at the Global CDM DNA Forum, Bonn, November 13, 2014); UNFCCC, CDM 
Has Wide Role to Play Before and After 2020, June 1, 2015, http://newsroom.unfccc.int/financial-flows/cdm-has-role-to-play-in-pre-and-post-2020-world/.
Potential supply of CERs until 2020Figure 9
PoAs+Projects registered (issuance 
 potential not adjusted per current  
 issuance rates)
PoAs+Projects that issued CERs 
( issuance potential not adjusted per  
current issuance rates)
PoAs+Projects registered and with no 
 inter ruption in verification (issuance  potential 
adjusted per current issuance rates)
PoAs+Projects that issued CERs  
and with no interruption in veri fication 
(issuance  potential adjusted per current 
issuance rates)
202020192018201720162015
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
1,000
3,000
2,000
0
Source: World Bank Group, figures based on  UNFCCC 
data as of July 6, 2015.
Note: CER = Certified Emission Reduction; PoA = Program  
of Activities; CDM = Clean Development Mechanism.
Vo
lu
m
e 
(M
tC
O
2
e)
35
Market and policy update of mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and new mechanisms under the UNFCCCTable 1 
N
ew
 A
pp
ro
ac
he
s
Market update Policy update
CDM
 – The number of projects and PoAs registered in 2014 was 160, 
53% lower than in 2013. 
 – The number of CERs issued in 2014 was 104 MtCO2e, 61% 
lower than in 2013. This continues the declining  
trend of the CDM market, as shown in Figure 10. 
 – In the primary CER market, a total of 60 million CERs were 
 traded, a 70% drop with respect to 2013.a Over half of these 
transactions were made by the governments of Norway and 
 Sweden through their CER purchase programs.b 
 – 25 million primary CERs are expected to be traded in 2015.c
 – The average CER price on the secondary market was €0.17/
tCO2e (US$0.19) in 2014, more than 50% lower than in 2013.
d 
 – Procedures for voluntary deregistration of projects were 
adopted in 2015.e 
 – An online platform for voluntary cancellation of CERs will 
be launched on September 22, 2015.f  
 – Efforts continue to streamline CDM procedures through 
digitalization of forms, simplification of methodologies, and 
simplified registration for projects that automatically qualify 
as additional.g 
 – The CDM Executive Board and the UNFCCC Secretariat 
are actively investigating alternative uses of the CDM 
infrastructure beyond an offset mechanism under the 
Kyoto Protocol, to increase the demand for the CDM and 
strengthen its ability to enhance mitigation activities.h 
JI
 – No project was registered in 2014.i 
 – The number of ERUs issued in 2014 was 31 MtCO2e, 83% 
less than in 2013. This continues the declining trend of the  
JI market, as shown in Figure 10.
 – In 2014, no primary ERU contracts were closed and only  
17.8 MtCO2e of trading took place on the secondary market.
j  
 – The ERU price fell to €0.03 (US$0.03) in December 2014.k 
 – The UNFCCC Secretariat produced a technical paper on 
how the JI can achieve cost savings and efficiencies, based 
on lessons learned from the CDM. The findings of this 
paper may be taken into account in future deliberations.l 
IET
 – The true-up period for the first Kyoto Commitment Period 
(CP1) ends on November 18, 2015. Before the end of this 
period, countries need to retire sufficient eligible units to  
cover their CP1 emissions.m 
 – Little progress has been made, as the Doha agreement 
has not been ratified.
 – No further decisions have been made since Doha, 2012, 
on the carry-over of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from 
CP1 to CP2.
NMM and FVA
 – Not operational  – Progress has been limited. The role of the mechanisms 
in the post-2020 agreement and their technical design 
remain open. 
 – No conclusion has been reached and the issues were 
placed on the preliminary agenda for SBSTA 43, to be  
held in Paris, in December 2015.n 
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Figure 10
a Thomson Reuters, 2014 Year in Review and Outlook: Asia on the Rise, 
Carbon Market Analyst, January 2015. 
b Ibid. 
c Ibid. 
d Intercontinental Exchange ICE, Daily Future sCERs. 
e UNFCCC, CDM Executive Board Eighty-Second Meeting Report, February 
20, 2015. 
f UNFCCC, Online Platform for Voluntary Cancellation, accessed September 
4, 2015, http://customers.meta-fusion.com/wcm/150720_5051_UNFC-
CC_CDM-EB_85_Bonn/download/2.2_4%20EB85_VC_tool.pdf. 
g UNFCCC, Decision 4/CMP.10, Guidance Relating to the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism. 
h UNFCCC, CDM Executive Board Eighty-Fourth Meeting Report, May 28, 
2015. 
Note: The true-up period refers to the additional period given for fulfilling commitments.
i UNEP DTU Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development, UNEP 
DTU CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, August 1, 2015, http://www.
cdmpipeline.org/; UNEP DTU Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable 
Development, JI Pipeline, August 1, 2015, http://www.cdmpipeline.org/
publications/JiPipeline.xlsx. 
j Thomson Reuters, 2014 Year in Review and Outlook: Asia on the Rise. 
k Ibid. 
l UNFCCC, Opportunities for Cost Savings and Efficiencies in Joint Implementa-
tion, Learning from Experience with the Clean Development Mechanism While 
Recognizing the Respective Mandates of the Two Mechanisms, April 21, 2015. 
m UNFCCC, SIAR - True-up Period Report Procedure, October 8, 2014. 
n IISD, Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference 1-11 June 2015, 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin Vol 12, Issue 638 (2015).
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2.2.2
International carbon pricing  
outside of the UNFCCC
Voluntary carbon market In 2014, carbon offsets 
worth US$395 million were purchased, representing a 
volume of 87 MtCO2e, up 13.6 percent with respect to 
2013. However, the annual issuance volumes and prices 
of carbon offsets continue to fall, as shown in Figure 10. 
This trend can be attributed to the policy uncertainty 
and the diminishing number of new corporate offsetting 
programs.54 Yet the issuance and price decreases seen 
in the voluntary market are less substantial than in the 
CDM market.  
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation, 
Forest Degradation, and the role of con-
servation, sustainable management of 
 forests, and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (REDD+) On June 9, 2015, an agreement 
was reached on the outstanding items on the agenda for 
the UNFCCC’s REDD+ mechanism: safeguards, non-
market-based approaches, and non-carbon  benefits.55 
Draft decisions on these issues have been forwarded for 
consideration and adoption at COP 21. If these deci-
sions are adopted in Paris, there will be adequate guid-
ance for implementation of REDD+,  complementing 
the Warsaw Framework on REDD+ adopted at 
COP 19.56 Countries are making progress on  establishing 
54 Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, Ahead of the Curve: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2015, June 2015.
55 UNFCCC, Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sus-
tainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries, June 9, 2015.
56 Gustavo A. Silva-Chávez, Surprising Development at UN Climate Meetings: REDD+ Is Finished, Forest Trends, June 9, 2015.
Annual and cumulative CER and ERU issuance, secondary CER prices (left), and voluntary offset issuance and prices (right)Figure 10
Source: UNFCCC for CDM and JI data on issuances, Intercontinental Exchange ICE for CDM data on prices, Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace for data on voluntary offsets.
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the national REDD+ infrastructure and REDD+ projects 
have already been launched, primarily through financing 
from donor countries rather than carbon markets.57 For 
example, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility’s (FCPF) 
Readiness Fund provides technical guidance58 and the 
BioCarbon Fund’s Initiative for Sustainable  Forest Land-
scapes will purchase significant portions of verified emis-
sion reductions from successful programs. These large 
forest carbon operations are essential ingredients for 
low-carbon development in many countries.
The New York Declaration on Forests estimates emis-
sions could potentially be reduced by 4.5–8.8 GtCO2e 
per year by 2030.59 These numbers assume country- 
specific policy reforms to be successfully adopted and 
certain strategies aimed at reducing forest emissions 
to be implemented, for example, land use planning, 
 increased transparency, and law enforcement. Many of 
the  technical concerns about REDD+ can be addressed 
today, for instance, by managing risks through buffers.
Results-Based Finance The RBF approach 
 provides a mitigation activity with financial support once 
its  emission reductions have been duly verified. Some 
RBF programs purchase compliance emission  reduction 
units, including CERs and ERUs,60  helping bridge the 
 current lack of  demand for these units.  Other  programs 
not  specifically designed for  compliance  markets use 
RBF as a direct funding mechanism.61  Elements of 
the existing  carbon market infrastructure, such as the 
CDM  monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
 requirements, have been incorporated into some  programs, 
 including the Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) 
and the Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate 
Change Mitigation (PAF), which purchase CERs. Other 
current programs, such as the Performance Based  Climate 
Finance Facility (PBC) in Latin America, were built from 
the ground up. 
The PAF provides project developers with a  guaranteed 
minimum price for reducing methane emissions through 
the auctioning of tradable put options. The first  auction 
for the PAF was held on July 15, 2015, and was  attended 
by 28 bidders from 17 countries. There were 12  winners 
from developing countries. The clearing price in this 
auction was US$2.40/tCO2e and 8.7 MtCO2e of put 
options were sold. The PAF currently has  capitalization 
of over US$50 million through contributions from 
 Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States, 
and aims to reach US$100 million.62 Another two or 
three auctions are planned over the next year and a half. 
International Aviation The international  aviation 
industry’s commitment to limit its emissions was 
 affirmed by the 2013 Assembly of the International 
 Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which resolved to 
cap net carbon emissions at 2020 levels.63 The ICAO has 
identified four pillars of climate action, which it intends 
to use to meet its emission reduction target:  technology, 
operations, infrastructure, and a global market-based 
measure (MBM). The 2013 Assembly decided to finalize 
the MBM by 2016, and set into motion several actions 
to accomplish this task:
 – Finalize work on the technical aspects, environmental 
and economic impacts and modalities of the  possible 
options for a global MBM scheme, including its 
 feasibility and practicability;
 – Organize seminars and workshops on a global scale 
for international aviation officials and experts of 
member states as well as relevant organizations; and
 – Identify the major issues and problems, including 
those expected to affect its member states, and make 
recommendations for a global MBM scheme to be 
implemented by 2020.
Further details on the development of the MBM are 
provided in Box 4.
57 Gustavo A. Silva-Chávez, On the Road to Paris. Next Stop: Bonn, June 2015, Forest Trends, June 10, 2015.
58 Key outcomes include national REDD+ strategies, effective stakeholder participation, safeguard instruments, reference levels and national forest monitoring 
systems. 14 countries are developing large-scale emission reductions programs to implement their national strategies combining high climate impact potentials 
and development benefits. These programs range from supporting communities in establishing new agricultural production schemes to encouraging the supply of 
deforestation-free agricultural commodities and managing protected areas. 
59 Climate Summit 2014, FORESTS: Action Statements and Action Plans, September 23, 2014.
60 Examples include the Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) and the Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation (PAF).
61 Examples include the Energy+ Partnership, the Nordic Climate Facility and the Facility for Performance Based Climate Finance in Latin America from the 
 Development Bank of Latin America (CAF). 
62 World Bank, First Pilot Auction to Capture Methane a Success, July 17, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/07/17/first-pilot- 
auction-to-capture-methane-a-success.
63 ICAO, Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and practice related to environmental protection – Climate change, 2013.
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A global market-based measure for a global industryBox 4
By Paul Steele, Senior Vice-President, Member and External Relations & Corporate Secretary  
Inter national Air Transport Association (IATA)
The global air transport sector links economies and societies. It provides connectivity to over three billion 
passengers a year, supports US$2.4 trillion in global GDP, almost 60 million jobs, a third of world trade 
by value and half of all international tourists. It is also growing fast, particularly in emerging economies. 
 Recognizing the need for the sector to both foster this growth and also play its part in meeting the climate 
change challenge, the aviation industry has set comprehensive short-, medium-, and long-term climate goals.
Coordinated by the industry-wide Air Transport Action Group, the goals are to:
1. Improve the fuel efficiency of the world fleet by an average 1.5% per annum, a goal it is already exceeding; 
2. Stabilize net aviation CO2 emissions at 2020 levels through carbon-neutral growth;
3. Halve aviation’s net CO2 emissions by 2050, compared with a 2005 baseline.
Significant work is underway to meet the first and third goal through new technology, alternative fuels, 
better operational methods and improved infrastructure such as air traffic management reforms. However, 
the mid-term goal of capping CO2 at 2020 levels will be achieved through a global market-based measure 
(MBM), currently being developed through the sector’s specialized UN agency, the International Civil Aviation 
 Organization (ICAO).
The industry itself has taken the unusual position of calling for such a measure and is actively involved in its 
 design, arguing that a global standard scheme is favourable to a patchwork of disjointed regional or national  
measures that would increase compliance complexity, reduce environmental integrity and lead to market dis tortion. 
Airlines are fiercely competitive businesses, operating in an international environment. Whilst the  implementation 
of such a measure will place a financial burden on airlines, it is fairly modest compared with the costs of fuel 
(around a third of airline operating costs) and the competitive impact that unaligned schemes will bring.
In order to have a global MBM in place in time for the 2020 start date (which neatly now coincides with the 
start of the next UNFCCC commitment period to hopefully be agreed upon at COP 21), the industry has 
called for a simple offsetting scheme as the best option to fulfil its criteria.
The ICAO Assembly (a meeting of 191 government representatives) in 2013 supported the development 
of such a global MBM, to be presented at the next ICAO Assembly in September 2016. In the three inter-
vening years, both political and technical design elements are being debated, analyzed and discussed by 
 representatives of governments, industry and civil society. Political questions include how to take account of 
the need to reflect maturity of developed and developing markets, whilst maintaining a level playing field for 
airlines. Technical discussions have centered on the eligibility criteria of offsets (does the scheme use CDM, 
VCS, REDD+, etc?); and the MRV requirements for such a scheme.
Progress is extremely encouraging and the industry is putting all of its efforts into achieving a final agreement 
in September next year. This is not a process without challenges, but it is also the first time such a global 
mechanism for an individual sector has ever been attempted.
For further information about aviation’s climate action, see www.enviro.aero. 
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2.3
REGIONAL, NATIONAL, AND  
SUBNATIONAL CARBON PRICING  
INSTRUMENTS
Carbon pricing has been implemented or is  scheduled 
for implementation in 39 national and 23 subnational 
jurisdictions. Together, these carbon pricing instruments 
cover some 7 GtCO2e, or about 12 percent of annual 
global GHG emissions.64, 65 ETSs cover 8 percent of 
 annual global GHG emissions, while a further 4 percent 
are covered by carbon taxes. As highlighted in Figure 11, 
the sectoral coverage of carbon pricing instruments 
 varies per jurisdiction, but typically includes the power 
and industry sectors.  
Further details on the key developments in carbon 
pricing over 2014–1566 are presented by jurisdiction 
 below, in alphabetical order. This convention will be 
used throughout this section. It should be noted that 
this section is not intended to be exhaustive, but  rather 
a summary of the most recent developments in the 
 instruments implemented and currently being designed 
or proposed. 
Canada and the United States In the absence 
of national carbon pricing instruments in Canada and 
the United States, ETSs are continuing to develop and 
 mature in California, Québec, the RGGI states, and 
other states and provinces. The California and  Québec 
Cap-and-Trade programs officially linked up in  January 
2014, and the first shared auction took place in  November 
2014. The scope of both programs was  enlarged in 2015 
to include transport fuels. This  extended the coverage 
to 85 percent of California and Québec’s total GHG 
emissions. Continuation of the California Cap-and-
Trade Program post-2020 is currently in the  legislative 
process.67 This follows California’s  announcement 
of a 2030 target to reduce GHG emissions by 
40 percent with respect to the 1990 emission  level, 
a target that has been incorporated into a bill for 
 consideration in the legislature.68 
Since reaching the 2014 US$4/short ton of 
CO2 (US$4.4/tCO2)  trigger price for RGGI’s cost 
containment reserve (CCR)69 at the first auction held in 
2014, the auction clearing price has steadily increased. 
At the most recent auction, held in March 2015, the 
auction clearing price reached US$5.5/short ton of 
CO2 (US$6.1/tCO2),
70  below the 2015 CCR trigger 
price of US$6/short ton of CO2 (US$6.6/tCO2). A 
comprehensive review of RGGI is expected no later than 
2016; it will consider potential additional reductions to 
the cap post-2020 and other program design elements.71 
64 These numbers are revised on a regular basis to reflect updated figures on GHG emissions in each jurisdiction, changes in the design and coverage of existing 
carbon pricing instruments, the inclusion of new instruments, and the availability of new data. Thus, these figures and the ones from previous reports are not 
necessarily comparable.
65 It should be noted that 100 percent coverage of GHG emissions by carbon pricing instruments is neither desirable nor realistic. 
66 This report covers the period from January 1, 2014 to August 31, 2015. 
67 Environmental Defense Fund, Carbon Market California, 2015.
68 Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Establishes Most Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target in North America, April 29, 2015, http://
gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18938; State of California, California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006: Emissions Limit, SB-32, 2015. 
69 RGGI, Summary of RGGI Model Rule Changes: February 2013, n.d. 
70 RGGI, Auction Results, accessed May 19, 2015, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results. 
71 RGGI, RGGI 2012 Program Review: Summary of Recommendations to Accompany Model Rule Amendments, 2013.
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In addition, another two U.S. states are actively 
 considering the implementation of an ETS:  Washington 
and Oregon. After the Washington State legislature 
failed to pass the ETS bill on June 28, 2015,72 Governor 
Inslee announced on July 28, 2015 that his government 
would implement a regulatory cap on GHG emissions, 
which may allow emitters to trade among themselves.73 
Oregon is currently debating bills in both the House and 
Senate. One pair of bills (SB965 and HB3250) would 
 introduce a cap-and-dividend program to reduce GHG 
emissions.74 This program would essentially  operate 
like an ETS, except that the auction revenue would be 
 distributed to tax payers in the form of a “ dividend.” 
 Another bill (HB3470) sets a cap on Oregon’s GHG 
emissions and mandates the implementation of an ETS.75 
 
On April 13, 2015, the Canadian province of  Ontario 
announced its intention to implement an ETS linked 
to California and Québec’s Cap-and-Trade programs.76 
Ontario also signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with Québec to collaborate on market mechanisms and 
harmonize GHG emission reporting. Alberta amended 
the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, in June 2015, to 
extend the scheme through 2017.77 Under the previous 
rules, facilities with annual emissions of 0.1 MtCO2e or 
more were required to reduce their emissions  intensity by 
12 percent with respect to the average emissions  intensity 
in 2003–05. Under the amended rules, the  required 
emissions intensity reduction will be raised to 15 percent 
on January 1, 2016, and to 20 percent on  January 
1, 2017.78 Also, facilities that choose to meet their 
 compliance by contributing to the Climate Change and 
Emissions  Management Fund will face higher costs. The 
current carbon price of CAN$15/tCO2e (US$11/tCO2e) 
will increase to CAN$20/tCO2e (US$15/tCO2e) on 
 January 1, 2016, and to CAN$30/tCO2e (US$23/tCO2e) 
on January 1, 2017. British Columbia’s  carbon 
tax  remains at the 2012 level of CAN$30/tCO2e 
(US$23/tCO2e). 
The United States Environmental Protection  Agency’s 
(US EPA)—through its Clean Power Plan, finalized on 
August 3, 2015—has set an emission reduction target 
of 32 percent of 2005 levels by 2030 for the country’s 
power sector.79 This represents a 7 percent increase in 
the targeted emission reductions with respect to the 
draft regulation released in 2014. The Clean Power 
Plan  reduces power sector emissions through a range 
of measures. States have the flexibility to choose their 
own  compliance mechanisms, including emissions 
trading, efficiency measures, and increased deployment 
of renewable energy. This will enable California and the 
RGGI states to use their existing ETSs to meet their 
emissions target. The Clean Power Plan has received 
overall  support from officials representing the California 
Cap-and-Trade Program and RGGI.80 
The United States has also been active inter nationally, 
signing a bilateral agreement with China on  emission 
 reduction targets on November 12, 2014.81 In this agree-
ment, the US and China announced their  respective 
 post-2020 emission reduction targets, which are  reiterated 
in their INDCs (see section 2.2.1 for more details). 
Chile In September 2014, the Chilean Parliament 
 approved the implementation of a national carbon 
tax. The tax will put a price on emissions from 2017 
onward.82 The tax applies to all stationary sources with 
72 Washington State Legislature, HB1314 – 2015-2016 Implementing a carbon pollution market program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, August 12, 2015, 
http://app.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=1314&year=2015.
73 Governor Jay Inslee, Inslee Directing Ecology to Develop Regulatory Cap on Carbon Emissions, July 28, 2015, http://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/ inslee-
directing-ecology-develop-regulatory-cap-carbon-emissions.
74 State of Oregon, Relating to Climate Protection; Prescribing an Effective Date, SB 965, 2015; State of Oregon, Relating to Climate Protection; Prescribing an 
Effective Date, HB 3250, 2015.
75 State of Oregon, Relating to Greenhouse Gas Emissions; Declaring an Emergency, HB 3470 B, 2015.
76 Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, Ontario Government, How Cap and Trade Works, April 13, 2015, http://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2015/04/
how-cap-and-trade-works.html.
77 Province of Alberta, Alberta Regulation 139/2007, Climate Change and Emissions Management Act: Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, 2015. 
78 Alberta Environment and Parks, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, accessed August 10, 2015, http://esrd.alberta.ca/focus/alberta-and-climate-change/ 
regulating-greenhouse-gas-emissions/greenhouse-gas-reduction-program/default.aspx.
79 EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 2015.
80 RGGI, RGGI States Comments Support EPA Proposed Clean Power Plan, November 7, 2014; California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, “Letter to Ms. 
Janet McCabe RE: Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602,” November 24, 2014, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/powerplants/ca-comments-2014-clean-power-plan.pdf.
81 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, November 12, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change.
82 Tax payments for the 2017 calendar year will be due in April 2018. 
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a thermal input capacity greater than 50  megawatts 
(MW).83 The value of this tax is denominated in 
U.S. dollars. The level of this tax is the local  currency 
equivalent of US$5/tCO2e, which means that tax 
 liabilities in the local currency will depend on the 
 prevailing exchange rate on the day of payment.84 
China The seven pilot ETSs combined form the largest 
national carbon pricing initiative in the world in terms 
of volume, putting a cap on 1.3 GtCO2e.
85 Since the 
start of the pilot ETSs in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, and Tianjin in 2013, and in Chongqing and 
Hubei in 2014, the designs of some of these systems have 
been rapidly evolving – their scope has been expanding 
and their stringency has been increasing. For example, 
Shenzhen is planning to expand its ETS to include 
transport;86 Guangdong is considering including more 
industrial sectors, buildings, and transport; and Hubei is 
adding 49 new companies to its pilot ETS.87 In addition, 
Chongqing has reduced its cap at a greater rate than 
 anti cipated, lowering the number of allowances freely 
allocated by 7 percent with respect to the 2013 level.88 
For the compliance year 2014, which ended in 
June or July 2015 (depending on the jurisdiction), 
24.7  million allowances were traded in all systems 
 combined.89 In Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, 
 Shenzhen, and Tianjin, between 99 and 100 percent 
of the companies met their compliance  obligations, 
while 70 percent of the  participants in  Chongqing, and 
80 percent of the participants in Hubei90 met the first 
 compliance in June 2015. The amount of  Chinese 
 offsets has also been growing,  bringing the total  number 
of offsets issued to about 25 million by the end of July 
2015.91 Most Chinese offsets are  location-specific and 
restricted to the compliance  market of the region in 
which the offset project is located. 
Over the past year, China has focused on  extending 
 emissions trading beyond the seven pilot regions.  Guangdong 
and Shenzhen are exploring a more  coordinated  approach to 
their respective ETS  pilots,92 while Beijing is  exploring an 
inter-regional ETS with  Chengde city in Hebei province.93 
Furthermore,  Shanghai is  considering regional  cooperation 
with  Zhejiang,  Jiangsu, Anhui,  Jiangxi, Shandong, and the 
 Fujian  provinces to exchange  information and  discuss ETS 
 design and  operation.94 In addition, Gansu,  Qingdao,95 
Hangzhou, and Anhui96 are investigating the implementation 
of their own ETSs.  Finally, Beijing, Tianjin, and the Hubei 
 provinces have signed an agreement to  cooperate on GHG 
 mitigation activities.97 
On June 15, 2015, Taiwan adopted the Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction and Management Act.98 This law sets 
an emission reduction target of 50 percent below 2005 
 levels by 2050 and indicates that one of the major means 
to achieve this target will be an ETS. However, the 
schedule for launching the ETS is unclear. 
83 Ministry of Finance, Chile, Ley Nº 20780, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1067194. 
84 Ministry of Finance, Chile, 2014, Tax reform to amend the system of income taxation and introduce various adjustments in the tax system, http://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar?idNorma=1067194.
85 Authors’ calculation, based on cap for 2015 or the latest year for which information is available.
86 Carbon Pulse, Shenzhen Set to Broaden out Emissions Scheme, March 16, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/shenzhen-set-to-broaden-out-emissions-scheme/.
87 Carbon Pulse, Hubei to Expand Emissions Trading Scheme, December 3, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/hubei-to-expand-emissions-trading-scheme-state-media/.
88 Chongqing Municipal Development and Reform Commission, Chongqing Municipal Development and Reform Commission issued a notice of 2014 annual 
Chongqing carbon emissions quotas, March 19, 2015, http://www.cqdpc.gov.cn/article-1-21088.aspx; Carbon Pulse, Chongqing Cuts Allocation by 9 Million 
Permits in 2014, March 10, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/chongqing-allocates-115-7-million-permits-for-2014/.
89 Carbon Pulse, China Sees Six-Fold Increase in Carbon Trading Volumes despite Teething Issues, July 21, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/china-sees-six-fold-in-
crease-in-carbon-trading-volumes-despite-teething-issues/.
90 ICAP, Second Compliance Period Ends in Chinese ETS Pilots, July 28, 2015, https://icapcarbonaction.com/news/news-archive/294-second-compliance-period-
ends-in-chinese-ets-pilots.
91 Carbon Pulse, China Issues Fresh Batch of 5.1 Mln Mostly Ineligible Carbon Offsets, August 3, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/china-issues-fresh-batch-of-5-1-
mln-mostly-ineligible-carbon-offsets/.
92 Carbon Pulse, Guangdong close to Launch 600 Million Yuan Carbon Fund, March 17, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/guangdong-close-to-launch-600-million-
yuan-carbon-fund/.
93 Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, Regional Committee Held in Beijing and Hebei on Emissions Trading, December 19, 2014, http://
www.bjpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201412/t8594655.htm.
94 Shanghai Municipal Development and Reform Commission, Regional Cooperation Seminar Held on Emissions Trading, accessed April 28, 2015, http://www.
shdrc.gov.cn/second.jsp?colid=551&top_id=316&artid=24800.
95 Qingdao Municipal People’s Government, Notice on the Organization and Implementation of Low-Carbon City Qingdao Pilot Carbon Emissions Trading Market 
Embodiments, September 24, 2014, http://www.qingdao.gov.cn/n172/n68422/n68424/n30259215/n30259219/140924163750977834.html.
96 Anhui People’s Government, Anhui Provincial People’s Government Office on the Issuance of Anhui 2014-2015 Annual Energy Saving and Emission Reduction 
Carbon Development Action Programs, September 24, 2014, http://www.ah.gov.cn/UserData/DocHtml/1/2014/12/9/6417463050796.html.
97 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, November 11, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change.
98 Government of Taiwan, Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act, 2015. 
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At the national level, China has committed to reach 
its peak in GHG emissions around 2030,99 with best 
efforts to peak earlier. In addition, details are  gradually 
being revealed on a nationwide ETS, which may be 
launched by the end of 2016 and fully implemented 
in 2019.100 The general rules of the national ETS were 
published by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) in December 2014.101 The 
 national ETS should cover power generation, metallurgy 
and non-ferrous metals, building materials, chemicals, 
and aviation.102 The importance of the national ETS for 
China to achieve its GHG emission objective is high-
lighted by the ETS’s inclusion in China’s INDC.103 The 
latter also includes its post-2020 emission reduction 
 target, announced on November 12, 2014104  after a  bi lateral 
agreement with the United States had been reached on 
emission reduction targets.  China also  continues to seek 
cooperation with the EU on  carbon markets, as specified 
in the EU-China Joint  Statement on Climate Change, 
through, among  others, its  capacity-building activities in 
preparation for the  national ETS.105 
EU In the course of 2014, the price of allowances in 
the EU ETS has increased from less than €5/tCO2 
(US$5/tCO2) to just below €7/tCO2 (US$8/tCO2). The 
average price in 2014 was €6/tCO2 (US$7/tCO2), with 
a total trading volume of 6.1 billion allowances.106 As of 
August 1, 2015, the EU allowance price stands slightly 
below €8/tCO2 (US$9/tCO2).
In February 2014, the European Union decided to 
temporarily postpone the auctioning of 900 million 
EU allowances from the period 2014–16 to the period 
2019–20, a process known as backloading. Following 
this change, the focus of the EU ETS structural reform 
shifted to the need for greater price stability and 
 predictability through flexibility of allowance  supply in the 
EU ETS. The proposed MSR is designed to achieve this 
goal by removing allowances from the  market if  supply is 
much higher than demand, and injecting  allowances into 
the market if the market is  undersupplied. At the May 
5, 2015 “trilogue” meeting of the  European Parliament, 
 European Council, and European  Commission,  consensus 
was reached on a 2019 start date for the MSR. The agree-
ment further specifies that the 900 million back-loaded 
EU allowances will be placed in the MSR, instead of 
returned to the market in 2019–20. The MSR  proposal 
also includes provisions for the fate of the  so-called 
“ unallocated” allowances – leftover  allowances available at 
the end of EU ETS Phase III in 2020 that were intended 
for new and expanding installations, and allowances that 
were returned by  installations after ( partially) shutting 
down. Barring special measures, these  allowances would 
come onto the market in 2020,  thereby undermining 
the operation of the MSR.107 The  European Parliament 
approved the MSR on July 8, 2015.108 Formal adoption 
of the MSR is expected in September 2015, following 
approval by the European Council. The  other  significant 
change to the EU ETS was the approval of a new carbon 
leakage list for the period 2015–19 on  October 27, 2014. 
The EU has committed to reducing emissions by at 
least 40 percent with respect to the 1990 baseline level 
by 2030 through domestic actions.109 The EU ETS will 
be the main instrument to achieve this mitigation  target, 
corresponding to a 43 percent emission reductions by 
2030 compared with 2005 emissions in the sectors 
 covered by the EU ETS.110 The above target will help 
ensure that the EU is on a cost-effective track toward 
meeting its objective of cutting emissions by at least 
99 Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions, 2015. 
100 ICAP, China to Cap Emissions from Six Sectors, ETS to Launch 2016, February 9, 2015, https://icapcarbonaction.com/news/news-archive/268-china-to-cap-
emissions-from-six-sectors-ets-to-launch-2016.
101 National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China Order: No. 17, October 12, 2014, http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201412/
t20141212_652035.html.
102 ICAP, China to Cap Emissions from Six Sectors, ETS to Launch 2016, February 9, 2015, https://icapcarbonaction.com/news/news-archive/268-china-to-cap-
emissions-from-six-sectors-ets-to-launch-2016.
103 China, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, 2015. 
104 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, November 11, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change.
105 European Union-China, “EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change,” June 29, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/2015062901_statement_en.pdf. 
106 Thomson Reuters, Big Emitters Promise Cuts, but Pledges Are Hard to Compare, Carbon Market Monitor, January 15, 2015.
107 European Union, Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Establishment and Operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme and Amending Directive 2003/87/EC, 2015.
108 European Parliament, Parliament Adopts CO2 Market Stability Reserve, July 8, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/con-
tent/20150703IPR73913.
109 European Union, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and Its Member States, March 6, 2015.
110 European Council, European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) Conclusions, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf.
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80 percent by 2050. On July 15, 2015, the European 
Commission put forward a proposal for a revised EU ETS 
for the period after 2020.111 The key proposed changes 
are increasing the annual cap reduction from 1.74 to 
2.2 percent, adopting better targeted rules for the free 
 allocation of allowances (to guard against carbon leakage 
risks), and establishing funds using  allowances to finance 
low-carbon innovation in industry and  modernization 
of the energy sector in the lower-income member states. 
The proposal does not include any provisions for the use 
of international offsets after 2020.
France France’s carbon tax came into effect on April 1, 
2014, putting a carbon tax of €7/tCO2e (US$8/tCO2e) 
on the use of fossil fuels not covered by the EU ETS. 
The carbon tax rate increased to €14.5/tCO2e 
(US$16/tCO2e) in 2015 and will rise to €22/tCO2e 
(US$24/tCO2e) in 2016. On July 22, 2015, France 
formally adopted its Law on the Energy Transition to 
Green Growth. This law sets a trajectory for the country’s 
carbon tax level to rise to €56/tCO2e (US$61/tCO2e) 
in 2020, and €100/tCO2e (US$110/tCO2e) in 2030.
112 
This augmentation in the carbon tax rate will be revenue- 
neutral, as other taxes will be lowered.113 The afore-
mentioned law also sets the objective to reduce GHG 
emissions by 40 percent with respect to 1990 levels by 
2030, consistent with the EU target. 
Kazakhstan Full enforcement (of regulations) 
and trading in the Kazakhstan ETS started in 2014. 
Total trade volume over 2014 was low, with only 
35  trans actions, totaling 1.3 MtCO2e. The average price 
of  allowances in 2014 was KZT406 (US$2).114 Although 
the pilot phase was completed in 2013, the Kazakhstan 
ETS is still facing challenges with the MRV of GHG 
emissions, in particular regarding the  verification  process. 
The Kazakh government is looking to develop  clearer 
guidance,  formats, and templates for  monitoring.115 
Other elements of work on the ETS are efforts to  improve 
electronic reporting, develop and support the ETS  registry, 
implement benchmarking rather than  grandfathering as 
the free allocation methodology, and explore the potential 
to link with other existing carbon markets. 
Mexico In February 2014, the Mexican Ministry of 
Energy announced the possible development of an ETS 
in the energy sector. This would complement Mexico’s 
tax on fossil fuel sales, excluding natural gas, which went 
into effect on January 1, 2014. 
New Zealand As of June 1, 2015, Kyoto credits, 
with the exception of New Zealand-originated Assigned 
Amount Units (NZ-AAUs), are no longer allowed for 
compliance under the NZ ETS. As of that date, only 
domestic units, New Zealand Units (NZUs), and NZ-
AAUs can be used to meet compliance obligations.116 
This decision was motivated by changes in international 
rules and the oversupply of Kyoto markets. New Zealand 
will reassess this decision once  international market 
 conditions are better suited to its domestic  circumstances. 
A comprehensive review of the NZ ETS is scheduled 
in the second half of 2015. The exact scope, objective, 
process, and timing of the review are yet to be decided. 
However, the review will look to set a long-term 
 direction for the NZ ETS so that it is fit for  purpose 
and can evolve to assist in meeting New Zealand’s 
post-2020 commitments.
Norway In May 2015, the Norwegian government 
proposed several changes to the carbon tax rates, which 
entered into force on July 1, 2015.117 These changes 
include an increase in the tax rate for natural gas and 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)—from NOK337/tCO2 
(US$41/tCO2) to NOK412/tCO2 (US$50/tCO2) and 
NOK410/tCO2 (US$50/tCO2) respectively—bringing 
it in line with the tax rate for petrol. The higher  carbon 
111 European Commission - Climate Action, Revised Emissions Trading System Will Help EU Deliver on Climate Goals, July 15, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
news/articles/news_2015071501_en.htm.
112 French Senate, Bill on the Energy Transition to Green Growth, July 24, 2015, http://www.senat.fr/espace_presse/actualites/201406/engager_la_france_dans_
la_transition_energetique.html. 
113 French National Assembly, Bill on the Energy Transition to Green Growth, July 22, 2015, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0575.asp.
114 Caspy Commodity Exchange, Stock Trading in Quotas Are on the Increase, September 8, 2014, http://comex.kz/ru/press/news/42-
%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%B8-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D0
%BA%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BC-%D0%B8%D0%B4%D1%83%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%B-
B%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5. 
115 Aigerim Yergabulova, Kazakhstan Emission Trading Scheme (KAZ ETS): Status and Challenges of MRV, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/ 
documents/18.0-%20KAZAKHSTAN%20presentation-kaz.pdf.
116 New Zealand Environmental Protection Authority, “The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme: NZEUR Account Holders Access to Kyoto Units,” accessed 
August 10, 2015, http://www.eur.govt.nz/how-to/guides-hmtl/guides-pdf/NZEUR%20account%20holders%20access%20to%20Kyoto%20units.pdf.
117 Ministry of Finance, Norway, Changes in Tax, Royalty and Interest, Prop. 120 LS, 2015, http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/upload/Revidert_2015/dokumenter/pdf/prp120.pdf.
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tax has been linked to the delay in implementing a 
road tax on natural gas and LPG, which was intended 
to  stimulate the use of biogas. The government has also 
exempted the share of hydrogen gas in natural gas and 
LPG from the carbon tax. 
Portugal A carbon tax of €5/tCO2e (US$5/tCO2e) 
was approved in November 2014, as part of a  wider 
package on green tax reform. The carbon tax  entered 
into force on January 1, 2015. It applies to all  energy 
products used in non-EU ETS sectors and covers 
 approximately a quarter of the country’s GHG  emissions. 
The tax rate will be determined annually, based on 
the average EU allowance auction clearing price in 
the preceding years. The 2015 tax rate of €5/tCO2e 
(US$5/tCO2e) is  expected to yield approximately 
€95 million (US$104 million) in revenue. The full green tax 
reform package aims to be fiscally neutral and the  revenues 
from the carbon tax and other taxes will be  redistributed 
in the form of income tax relief to  lower-income families. 
Republic of Korea The Republic of Korea’s ETS 
entered into force on January 1, 2015, and covers 
23 subsectors, including steel, cement, petro- chemicals, 
refinery, power, buildings, waste, and aviation. In the first 
phase (2015–17), the affected installations will  receive 
a free allocation of 100 percent based on their  average 
2011–13 GHG emissions and the national GHG  reduction 
target. No auctioning is foreseen in the first phase. There 
is a perception that the Korean market is undersupplied, 
resulting in Korean companies being  reluctant to sell their 
allowances. The latest trading was reported on January 16, 
2015.118 Companies can also use Korean offsets, including 
Korean CERs,119 for up to 10 percent of their compliance 
obligation. Given that the price of CERs is much lower 
than that of Korean  Allowance Units (KRW10,300 or 
about US$9), some demand for CERs issued for projects 
in the Republic of Korea is to be expected.120 As of early 
July 2015, around 780,000 Korean offsets had been  traded 
on the Korean exchange.121 
Sweden The Swedish government is considering 
changes to the Swedish carbon tax. Under current rules, 
the carbon tax covers all fossil fuels used for heating that 
are not covered by the EU ETS and motor fuels. How-
ever, non-EU ETS installations, as well as the agriculture 
and forestry sectors receive tax rebates for their use of 
fossil heating fuels.122 Under the new rules considered for 
introduction in the 2016 Budget Bill, to be presented 
on September 21, 2015, the aforementioned tax rebates 
would be abolished as of January 1, 2016. The Swedish 
government argues that the removal of these tax  rebates 
would better align its policy with the polluter pays 
 principle, lead to a more cost-effective instrument, and 
improve the transparency of the taxation system.123 
Switzerland In Switzerland, the first auction of 
 allowances under its ETS was held in May 2014. As of 
August 1, 2015, four auctions had taken place,  showing 
a wide price range for emission allowances—ranging 
from CHF40/tCO2e (US$42/tCO2e) at the first auction 
of May 2014 to CHF12/tCO2e (US$12/tCO2e) at the 
auction held in February 2015. Switzerland and the EU 
continued negotiations on linking through a seventh 
round of talks, which took place in March 2015.124 
Switzerland’s carbon tax on thermal fuels (that is, 
 excluding fossil motor fuels) will be raised from the 
 current rate of CHF60/tCO2e (US$62/tCO2e) to 
CHF84/tCO2e (US$87/tCO2e) on January 1, 2016.
125 
This increase follows a 2015 review of Switzerland’s 
GHG emissions trajectory, which found that the  current 
emission level lies above the targeted level. The next 
review of the tax rate will be based on emissions from 
2016, and tax rates may have to be adjusted again as of 
2018, depending on the evolution of Switzerland’s GHG 
emissions trajectory. The maximum level of the tax rate 
is 120 CHF/tCO2e (US$125/tCO2e). 
Selected changes in the instruments are summarized 
in Box 5. 
118 Carbon Pulse, South Korea’s Hanwha Corp. to convert 286,000 CERs to Korean offsets, August 18, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/south-koreas-hanwha- corp-
to-convert-286000-cers-to-korean-offsets/.
119 CERs need to be canceled first before they can be converted to Korean offsets.
120 Carbon Pulse, UN Cancels First CERs Bound for Korean ETS, March 14, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/un-cancels-first-cers-bound-for-korean-ets/.
121 Carbon Pulse, Korean Market to Get Offset Infusion, Simpler Rules, July 6, 2015, http://carbon-pulse.com/korean-market-to-get-offset-infusion-simpler-rules/.
122 Ministry of Finance, Sweden, Certain Point Tax Issues Before the Budget Bill for 2016, June 25, 2015, http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/50c-
71588b22043e6ac47acbad136919f/vissa-punktskattefragor-infor-budgetpropositionen-for-2016.pdf.
123 Ibid.
124 Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, 7th Round of Negotiations for Switzerland-EU Linking of Emissions Trading Systems, March 26, 2015, http://www.bafu.
admin.ch/klima/13877/14510/14882/15415/index.html?lang=de.
125 Swiss Federal Office for the Environment, Imposition of the CO2 Levy on Thermal Fuels, July 3, 2015, http://www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/13877/14510/14748/index.html?lang=en. 
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Summary of selected changes in regional, national, and subnational carbon pricing instrumentsBox 5 
Instruments implemented in 2014: Hubei and Chongqing (ETS), Mexico and France (tax)
Instruments implemented in 2015: Korea (ETS), Portugal (tax) 
New instrument scheduled for implementation: Chile (tax), as of 2017
ETS under consideration or development: Washington and Oregon (US); Ontario (Canada); Mexico; 
Taiwan and nationally (China)
Scope expansion:
2014/2015: California and Québec included transport fuels, Hubei added new companies
Future developments: Shenzhen plans to include transport, Guangdong is considering the inclusion of 
 additional sectors
Price rate changes (tax only):
2014/2015: Norway’s carbon tax rate for natural gas and LPG increased in 2015, from NOK337/tCO2 
(US$41/tCO2) to NOK412/tCO2 (US$50/tCO2) and NOK410/tCO2 (US$50/tCO2), respectively; France’s 
carbon tax rate increased from €7/tCO2e (US$8/tCO2e) in 2014 to €14.5/tCO2e (US$16/tCO2e) in 2015
Future developments: France’s carbon tax rate to be raised to €56/tCO2 (US$61/tCO2) as of 2020 and to 
€100/tCO2 (US$110/tCO2) by 2030; Sweden’s carbon tax rebates to be removed for non-ETS, agriculture, 
and forestry as of 2016; Switzerland’s carbon tax to increase to CHF84/tCO2e (US$87/tCO2e) from 2016
Price/market stabilization mechanisms (ETS only): 
2014/2015: RGGI’s cost containment reserve triggered in 2014
Future developments: EU ETS to implement a market stability reserve as of 2019
Offsets: 
2014/2015: New Zealand’s ETS restricted use of offsets to domestically generated offsets only; growth in 
offsets for use in Chinese ETS pilots and the Republic of Korea’s ETS 
Future developments: The European Commission’s proposal of July 15, 2015 foresees no use of inter-
national offsets in the EU ETS for the revised EU ETS after 2020 
Linking: 
2014/2015: California and Québec Cap-and-Trade Programs linked up in 2014
Future developments: Ontario intends to join the California and Québec Cap-and-Trade Programs, Beijing  
is exploring linking with Chengde city, Shanghai is seeking regional cooperation on ETS
Instruments under review:
2014/2015: EU ETS started review for post-2020 
Future developments: Review of the New Zealand’s ETS to start in second half of 2015, RGGI in 2016 for 
post-2020, and Switzerland’s carbon tax in 2017.
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2.4
CORPORATE CARBON  
PRICING
Carbon pricing is spreading beyond the domain 
of government policy and becoming an increasingly 
 common tool in business decision making. Private 
 sector firms are adopting internal carbon prices, even in 
jurisdictions without legislated carbon pricing. Internal 
carbon pricing can be implemented in various forms: 
some companies incorporate it into the business case for 
investment, while other companies use it to transfer the 
costs of emissions offsetting to individual business units. 
Globally, at least 150 companies use an internal carbon 
price, as reported by the Carbon Disclosure  Project 
(CDP), with disclosed prices ranging from US$6 to 
US$89/tCO2e
126 (Figure 12). These companies represent 
diverse sectors of the economy, including the  consumer 
goods, energy, finance, industry, manufacturing, and 
utilities sectors.
For many businesses, using an internal carbon price 
is part of a risk management strategy to evaluate the 
 current or potential impact of a carbon price obligation 
on their operations. Furthermore, it is used as a means to 
identify and value cost savings and revenue opportunities 
in low-carbon investments. Corporate carbon pricing 
can also help companies demonstrate their support for 
 effective carbon pricing policies. Governments designing 
a carbon pricing instrument can benefit from the lessons 
learned through corporate carbon pricing initiatives such 
126 CDP, Global Corporate Use of Carbon Pricing: Disclosures to Investors, 2014.
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Source: Authors, based on CDP data.
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Price range of the average internal carbon price, as disclosed by companies to CDP Figure 12
Note: Some companies report that a price range is applied as part of a sensitivity analysis, or to 
take into account projected price increases and regional  differences in carbon prices.
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127 BP, BG Group, Eni, Repsol, Royal Dutch Shell, Statoil and Total. Source: Bloomberg, Repsol Signs Up to European Oil Group’s Stance on Climate Change, June 9, 
2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-09/repsol-signs-up-to-european-oil-group-s-stance-on-climate-change.
128 BG Group plc et al., May 29, 2015, http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2015/Downloads/Paying%20for%20Carbon%20letter.pdf.
129 World Bank, We Support Putting a Price on Carbon, 2014.
130 Mercer, Investing in a Time of Climate Change, 2015. 
131 Global Investor Coalition, with support from UNEP-FI and the World Bank Group, Financial Institutions Taking Action on Climate Change, 2014. 
132 The Storting, The Storting Has Made the Unanimous Decision to Pull the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) out of Coal, May 28, 2015,  
https://www.stortinget.no/en/In-English/About-the-Storting/News-archive/Front-page-news/2014-2015/hj9/.
133 Caring for Climate is a joint initiative of the UN Global Compact, UN Environment Programme, and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Business 
Leadership Criteria form one of the workstreams of the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, led by the World Bank Group. Partners on the Leadership Criteria 
include: WRI, CDP, The Climate Group, Principles for Responsible Investment, and UN Foundation.
134 For the full criteria, see: www.caringforclimate.org/carbonpricing. 
135 The input received is informing the Executive Guide to Carbon Pricing Leadership, to be released in draft form in September 2015 and launched at COP 21 in 
December 2015. For more information, visit www.caringforclimate.org/carbonpricing.
Highlights from Caring for Climate survey on carbon pricingBox 6 
By United Nations Global Compact
As far as many leading companies are concerned, internal carbon pricing does not need to be  complicated. 
While thorough analysis is needed to identify a meaningful price for carbon, complex modeling or 
 projections internally often creates confusion and delay in implementation. This is a key insight shared by the 
 respondents of a global survey of nearly 100 companies that are creating internal carbon pricing systems 
and engaging governments to advance effective market-based climate policies. 
Companies at the forefront are aligning with the UN Caring for Climate Business Leadership Criteria on 
Carbon Pricing.133 They are working to: (1) value carbon internally; (2) advocate for carbon pricing policies 
externally; and (3) report publicly on these activities.134 
UN Caring for Climate initiative (C4C) together with the World Resources Institute (WRI) took a closer look 
at companies’ approaches in 2015. The objective was to gather perspectives and experiences of individual 
companies confronting the challenges and maximizing the opportunities related to carbon pricing. To do this,  
C4C and WRI interviewed senior staff from nearly 20 companies and received further input through a 
global survey from approximately 100 companies across multiple sectors and geographies.135 
as the Business for Climate Platform (EPC-ETS), which 
operated an ETS simulation with the engagement of 
20 of the largest Brazilian companies. Further details on 
 corporate carbon pricing in practice are provided in Box 6. 
In the lead-up to COP 21, seven oil and gas 
 companies127 have called on governments and the 
 UNFCCC to introduce carbon pricing instruments in 
jurisdictions where they do not yet exist and to  create 
an international framework that could  eventually link 
 domestic instruments.128 This initiative adds weight to 
the growing number of private sector  representatives 
who have signaled their support for carbon  pricing. 
At the 2014 New York Climate Summit, over 
1,000  companies and investors voiced their support for 
carbon pricing policies in a public statement.129 
Long-term investors are also beginning to realize that 
climate change can undermine the financial returns of 
their portfolio and have started rethinking their invest-
ment strategies and practices. A recent study confirms 
that climate change will inevitably affect returns and that 
prudent investors could realize net gains by positioning 
across and within sectors and asset classes.130 Leading 
financial institutions are responding to climate risk by 
allocating capital and steering financial flows toward 
low-carbon and “climate-safe” activities. For example, 
the Swedish pension fund AP4 is decarbonizing its  equity 
portfolio by tilting it toward more carbon- efficient 
 companies.131 Also, the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund Global will cease investing in coal companies as of 
January 1, 2016.132 
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Most common benefits of carbon pricing Most common challenges of carbon pricing
1 Helps translate carbon into business- relevant terms  
and engage internally
Lack of common method or guidance to set a  
carbon price
2 Increases support and investment for energy  
efficiency projects
Lack of clarity and long-term certainty in countries’ 
climate policies 
3 Helps company achieve ambitious GHG  
reduction targets
Prices (internally or externally) too low to shift  
investment decisions
The effort yielded results that are consistent with general expectations. Companies from sectors or regions 
that are already subject to carbon pricing policies were largely ahead of others in terms of internal awareness 
and support at senior levels. Building internal capacity and engagement ranked among the most common 
benefits cited by companies that are pricing carbon internally (see the table below). 
Interestingly, some 40 percent of the companies that responded to the survey noted they had no plans 
and no interest in creating internal carbon pricing programmes. Most of these companies expressed one of 
two reasons for not pursuing carbon pricing: (1) they did not see carbon pricing as material or practical for 
their company/industry (i.e., not from regulated or energy-intensive sectors); or (2) they could not identify 
a clear methodology to create an internal carbon pricing programme. Nonetheless, more than half of these 
 companies still noted a desire to see an external carbon price and are actively engaging governments to 
advance such policies.
Those companies that have successfully established internal carbon pricing programmes tend to take a 
 simple, straightforward approach. They adapt carbon pricing to fit their own internal investment needs, 
 market interests, and outlooks (rather than trying to create complex formulas for predicting market prices  
and policy changes). Most companies do one or more of the following: 
 – Treat carbon pricing like any other effort to evaluate and account for financial risks, costs, and market 
opportunities.
 – Establish a modest carbon price as a means of creating internal awareness, funds, and incentives to 
 support GHG reduction goals. 
 – Build internal expertise on the topic and find influential channels (e.g., trade groups, leadership coalitions) 
to share their views and experiences.
In each case reviewed by C4C and WRI, champion companies are not waiting or trying to make guesses 
about the future. Instead they are accepting that eventually carbon costs will be reflected in market prices 
and taking prudent steps to ensure their business is “market-ready”.  
Based on insights in the draft Executive Guide to Carbon Pricing Leadership. For more information, visit 
www.caringforclimate.org/carbonpricing. 
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Competitiveness  
and carbon leakage 
section 3
C arbon prices are intended to have an efficient and fair impact on the relative competitiveness 
of firms. They are expected to favor innovative, clean 
firms, and facilitate the exit or upgrade of the least 
 efficient firms in emissions-intensive industries,  thereby 
 improving the overall efficiency of the economy. 
 Carbon prices are particularly effective at achieving such 
an  intended and efficient outcome if they are broadly 
similar across jurisdictions. 
However, as demonstrated in this report, current 
efforts to put a price on GHG emissions around the 
world remain fragmented. Both the coverage and carbon 
price vary significantly between jurisdictions. In such an 
asymmetric world, countries are legitimately concerned 
that their ambitious climate action may undermine 
the international competitiveness of some domestic 
sectors, which may lose market share and profit margins 
to competitors who do not face similar emission costs 
abroad. A phenomenon known as carbon leakage occurs 
if such differences in emission costs lead to the relocation 
of carbon-intensive activities and related emissions from 
jurisdictions with stringent climate policies (including a 
high price on carbon) to jurisdictions with less stringent 
climate policies (low or no price on carbon), resulting in 
higher emissions at the latter jurisdictions.136 In this way, 
climate policy in one country would favor inefficient, 
carbon-intensive firms abroad. 
So far, carbon or a broader emissions leakage has not 
materialized on any significant scale, at least not in the 
more advanced industrialized countries. However, as 
long as climate policies and carbon prices significantly 
differ between jurisdictions, the risk of carbon leakage 
seems real. This risk is nevertheless localized in a few 
exposed economic activities (not the whole economy) 
and can be effectively managed through policy design, 
as discussed in this section. 
The risk of carbon leakage declines as more countries 
take concrete action on climate change. International 
cooperation and coordination of climate policies is an 
ultimate remedy for the risk of leakage. It would help 
redress asymmetry in carbon pricing signals, thereby 
eliminating the need for protection of firms, although 
more research may be needed to understand the impact 
of similar carbon prices on firms in countries with very 
different income levels. 
This section unpacks the concerns over carbon leakage 
and reviews how they can best be addressed, drawing on 
experience and literature.
3 Competitiveness  
and carbon leakage
136 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines emissions leakage as “the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation 
action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries.” Source: IPCC, 2007, Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, Climate Change 
2007: Working Group III: Mitigation of Climate Change, section 11.7.2.
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3.1
ANALYZING CARBON PRICING’S  
IMPACT ON  
COMPETITIVENESS 
Legitimate concerns over carbon pricing’s potential 
impact on competitiveness arise when a different price 
is charged (or expectations about future prices differ) 
for firms’ or sectors’ GHG emissions in different 
jurisdictions, possibly causing emissions leakage. Holding 
all other things constant, if firms in one jurisdiction face 
a new cost that their competitors in another jurisdiction 
do not face, they will fear either a loss of market share 
or a reduction in profit margin, or both. If it leads 
to relocation of emissions-intensive production and 
associated emissions to a jurisdiction where emissions 
costs are lower, emissions leakage occurs.  
In reality, things are not that simple. Making firms 
pay for emissions does increase their costs, but this does 
not necessarily affect their competitiveness. In many 
sectors, companies do not compete mainly on costs, but 
rather on overall efficiency in converting complex input 
costs (energy, material, labor, land, knowledge) into 
high-value products and services.137 This is especially 
true in the more advanced markets where the product 
and consumer preferences are of a highly dynamic nature 
and very sophisticated. An increase in energy or labor 
costs often goes hand in hand with increased profits and 
productivity.138, 139 
However, for sectors producing relatively homogenous 
products—such as commodities, steel, cement, and 
electricity—cost competition is crucial. Such firms find 
it difficult to gain market share by differentiating their 
end products from those of their competitors. They 
must increase market share and profit margins mainly 
through production-side innovation and cost reduction. 
Often, production of these relatively homogenous goods 
is also emissions-intensive and carbon pricing could have 
a significant impact on companies’ production costs, 
leading to loss of their international competitiveness 
and, as a consequence, emissions leakage. In lower-
income countries, an increase in production costs may 
have challenging social and distributional consequences 
also for domestic consumers, which would need to be 
managed with a range of policies and institutions. The 
social and income distribution impacts are not the main 
focus of this section but may deserve special attention 
in future editions of the State and Trends of Carbon 
Pricing report. 
The cost impact of carbon pricing must be seen in the 
context of other business costs and risks, even in the case 
of homogenous products. Production and investment 
decisions are influenced by a wide range of factors, such 
as proximity to product markets and low-cost inputs, 
construction costs of new facilities, transport costs of 
reaching key markets, exchange rate fluctuations, labor 
costs, and overall business risks, as might be captured 
in a firm’s cost of capital.140 Factors, such as other taxes, 
the quality of institutions and infrastructure, are often 
far more significant in a company’s decisions than a 
carbon price.141 Besides, explicit carbon prices (carbon 
taxes and ETSs) are not the only instruments that make 
emissions-intensive firms internalize their emission 
costs. Firms are also affected by implicit and indirect 
carbon prices embedded in other policy instruments, 
such as energy taxes, emission standards, or support 
systems for renewable energy and energy efficiency.142 
These implicit and indirect carbon prices should also be 
considered when comparing carbon prices across firms 
and jurisdictions.143
The traditional notion of cost competitiveness is of 
little relevance at the national level.144 Countries do 
not compete with one another like firms do.145 Most 
137 Porter, M. E. “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy.” Harvard Business Review 57, no. 2 (March–April 1979): 137–145.
138 lbrizio, S., T. Ko luk and V. Zipperer, “Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Environmental Policy Stringency on Productivity Growth”, OECD Economics  Department 
Working Papers, No. 1179, OECD Publishing, 2014. 
139 Productivity is understood to be the value of output per unit of production inputs. 
140 Oliver Sartor and Thomas Spencer, An Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Carbon Leakage in Poland, Working Paper (IDDRI, 2013).
141 Julia Reinaud, Issues Behind Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: Focus on Heavy Industry (IEA, 2008).
142 Vivid Economics (2010), The implicit price of carbon in the electricity sector of six major economies, London.
143 OECD (2013a), Effective Carbon Prices, OECD Publishing, Paris.
144 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations,” Harvard Business Review Vol 68, Issue 2 (1990): 73–93; Josef T. Yap, “A Note on the Competitive-
ness Debate,” Philippine Journal of Development Vol XXXI, Issue 1 (2004). 
145 Paul Krugman, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, 1994.
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economists argue that “the only meaningful concept of 
competitiveness at the national level is productivity.”146 
In a similar vein, the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report defines national competitiveness 
as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country.”147 The 
competitive economies worldwide are usually not the 
economies that have the lowest labor or energy costs, but 
those that are able to generate the highest value from the 
total portfolio of its resources, skills, and other assets, and 
increase the sustainable prosperity of its population, as 
demonstrated by high-income countries. 
3.2
POSITIVE CARBON PRICING  
IMPACTS ON  
COMPETITIVENESS 
It needs to be stressed at the outset that putting 
a price on GHG emissions is meant to change the 
relative competitive position of firms. Carbon pricing 
is supposed to increase the financial costs of emissions-
intensive activities, as they inflict climate change 
damages on society, and promote low-emission activities 
that do not contribute to climate change.148 This result 
is an economically efficient and socially fair impact on 
the relative competitiveness of firms, which makes them 
face the truer economic cost of production. It levels 
the playing field between the emissions-intensive and 
relatively “clean” firms. The expected macroeconomic 
result is a shift in the structure of the economy toward 
low-carbon activities. 
Even fragmented carbon pricing may sometimes support 
the competitiveness of certain firms and productivity of 
the economy. The so-called Porter hypothesis suggests 
that properly designed environmental policies may—
under certain conditions—enhance the competitiveness of 
firms by inducing technology innovation and increasing 
productivity, thereby partly or fully offsetting the additional 
cost of compliance.149 This hypothesis has been widely 
tested since it was first formulated 20 years ago, at least 
for high-income OECD countries. Generally, there is clear 
and well-established empirical evidence for the “weak” 
version of the Porter hypothesis, that is, that environmental 
regulations indeed stimulated innovations and had no 
significant adverse impact on competitiveness.150 The 
evidence seems to be less conclusive for the “strong” version 
of the hypothesis, namely, that this innovation led to cost 
savings, which more than compensated for the additional 
costs of compliance, and enhanced business performance.151 
Environmental policies were found costless only under 
rare conditions of significant prior market barriers and 
where policy was designed as very efficient and market 
friendly.152 Certain studies even found some negative 
impact of stringent environmental policy on productivity 
and exports.153 However, this impact was small, and only 
affected a few sectors when the policy targeted production-
related emissions. Tightening environmental standards 
did not seem to reduce international competitiveness 
when pollution was generated by consumption. And 
where depletion of natural capital was at stake, effective 
environmental policy was found to contribute to 
developing long-run international competitiveness.154 
Interestingly, the more recent studies tend to provide 
clearer empirical support for the “strong” hypothesis that 
environmental regulations improve business performance, 
although the impact may differ by sector.155 
146 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations,” Harvard Business Review Vol 68, Issue 2 (1990): 73–93; Robert D. Atkinson, Competitiveness, 
 Innovation and Productivity: Clearing up the Confusion (ITIF, 2013).
147 Klaus Schwab, Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013. (World Economic Forum, September 2012).
148 Alex Bowen, The Case for Carbon Pricing (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics  
and Policy, December 2011).
149 Porter, Michael E. (1991), “America’s Green Strategy,” Scientific American (Apr. 1991), 168; Michael E Porter and Claas van der Linde, “Toward a New 
 Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship,” Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol 9, Issue 4 (November 1995): 97–118.
150 Lanoie. P., J Laurent-Lucchetti, N Johnstone, S Ambec. “Environmental policy, innovation and performance: new insights on the Porter hypothesis”. Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 20 (3): 803-842.
151 Jaffe, A., and K. Palmer (1997), Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel Data Study, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Nov., 
1997), pp. 610-619, MIT Press 1997. 
152 Brannlund, R., and T. Lundgren. 2009. “Environmental policy without costs? A review of the Porter Hypothesis”. International Review of Environmental and 
 Resource Economics 3 (2): 75–117.
153 Jug, Jerneja, Mirza, Daniel (2015), Environmental Regulations in Gravity Equations: Evidence from Europe, in: World Economy, Vol. 28, Blackwell Publishing Ltd
154 Copeland, Brian R., International Trade and Green Growth. World Bank, Washington, DC, (2012). 
155 Ambec, Stefan, et al., “The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?,” Review of Environmental 
 Economics and Policy Vol 7, Issue 1 (2013): 2–22. 
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However, it is important to note that the empirical 
evidence is based mainly on studies in the advanced 
industrialized countries, which have relatively few barriers 
to information and innovation. A recent OECD review 
also found that the tightening of environmental policies 
led to improvements in production efficiency, but mainly 
in already technologically advanced industries and firms, 
while less productive firms saw their productivity fall 
even further.156 This finding may have an important 
implication for extending carbon pricing to less 
developed countries where firms, particularly domestic 
firms in energy and labor-intensive sectors, are often less 
technologically advanced and not as productive as their 
foreign competitors; moreover, it is precisely these firms 
that account for a major share of the jobs and incomes of 
low-income households. Symmetric carbon pricing may 
have asymmetric impact across countries at different 
income levels. Some emerging research indicates that 
the longer-term effects on productivity and export can 
be positive, even in developing countries.157 However, 
more research is needed to better understand the impact 
of climate policies on the performance of firms in 
developing countries, especially of those traditionally 
dependent on fossil fuels. 
Another consistent finding is that market-based 
mechanisms (such as carbon pricing) tend to have a 
more robust positive effect on productivity than their less 
flexible alternatives.158 Firms also tend to prefer flexible 
economic instruments of environmental policy over 
command-and-control alternatives because the former 
offer companies greater flexibility regarding the means 
and timing of reducing emissions. They also provide 
firms with dynamic incentives for innovation and 
efficiency improvements, although some environmental 
performance standards can also be designed to foster 
such dynamic efficiency, for example, the EU’s Industrial 
Emissions Directive or the United States’ Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) vehicle standards.
There is growing evidence that environmental 
regulations do promote innovation in green technologies.159 
Even more important, green innovation appears to entail 
stronger growth benefits than traditional innovation in fossil 
fuel sectors. Clean technology research and development 
has economic benefits that spill over to the rest of the 
economy through diffusion of new knowledge, in a way 
that is comparable to the spinoff of “frontier” technologies 
such as robotics, IT, and nanotechnologies. Fossil-based 
technologies tend to find narrower, more traditional 
applications in mature, slower growing sectors.160  
As the aforementioned OECD review of existing 
evidence demonstrated, a large part of the economy-wide 
productivity gains from environmental policies stem from 
the exit of the least productive firms from the market. 
This is akin to other market transformations, which cause 
both losses and gains in different industries, even without 
climate policies, releasing workforce, land, and physical 
assets for a more productive use in other sectors.161 
For sectors and regions that have been affected 
by firms’ exits, the government may assist in shutting 
down the least efficient facilities and in retraining and 
reemploying workers in other, growing, sustainable 
sectors. Social protection provides additional safety nets 
156 Albrizio, S., T. Ko luk and V. Zipperer (2014), “Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Environmental Policy Stringency on Productivity Growth”, OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No. 1179, OECD Publishing. 
157 Zhu, J., and M. Ruth (2015), “Relocation or reallocation: Impacts of differentiated energy saving regulation on manufacturing industries in China,” Ecological 
Economics, 110, 119–133. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.12.020.
158 Silvia Albrizio, et. al, ibidem.
159 Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre, “Environmental Policy and Directed Technological Change: Evidence from the European Carbon Market,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics (2012).
160 Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Ralf Martin, and Myra Mohnen, Policy Brief: Clean Innovation and Growth (Imperial College London Business School, n.d.). 
161 Samuel Fankhauser, Friedel Sehlleier, and Nicholas Stern, “Climate Change, Innovation and Jobs,” Climate Policy Vol 8, Issue 4 (2008): 421–429.
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for those who find it difficult to transition to a new job. 
Public assistance can also facilitate skills development 
through national education systems. For example, 
Chile introduced its carbon tax with the explicit aim of 
providing additional resources to improve its education 
system.162 Countries and regions where many people 
rely on emissions-intensive industries for jobs and 
where incomes are lower and institutions weaker will 
be more vulnerable to an increase in carbon prices. This 
vulnerability can be reduced, for instance, by supporting 
innovation and energy efficiency improvements in the 
industrial sector (for example by providing access to 
information about new technologies and access to finance 
for SMEs). This enhances workforce capability to pursue 
new, “cleaner” business opportunities.163 Technology and 
resource transfers and institutional strengthening will 
be crucial to manage structural transformations in less 
advanced low-income countries.
3.3
ADVERSE IMPACT OF CARBON  
PRICES ON COMPETITIVENESS;  
CARBON LEAKAGE 
The likelihood of a positive impact of carbon pricing 
on firms’ productivity and their competitiveness 
is seriously challenged when asymmetric climate 
policies significantly differentiate price signals between 
jurisdictions. Industry and policy makers are often 
concerned that rather than enhancing the productivity 
of domestic firms, such asymmetric carbon pricing will 
benefit emissions-intensive firms abroad. The price 
signals may force specific sectors to shift their output and 
eventually also their investments to other countries, so-
called “pollution havens,”where firms face lower GHG 
emission costs.164 Policy makers and environmentalists 
are worried that this relocation could be followed by 
an increase in emissions at the new jurisdiction—
the carbon leakage discussed above. These concerns 
over the adverse impact on competitiveness and the 
possibility of carbon leakage are probably the single 
most common concern challenging the introduction of 
carbon prices around the world. 
If carbon leakage occurred, it would have two main 
knock-on effects on environmental policy objectives: 
it would reduce the environmental effect of emission 
reduction efforts and increase the cost of meeting 
specific climate targets. An increase in emissions in 
jurisdictions with low or no carbon prices would 
require additional efforts in the jurisdictions with 
carbon pricing policies in place to achieve the same net 
global emission reduction. 
Carbon leakage can occur through three main channels 
(Box 7); the short-term output channel, the long-term 
investment channel, and thirdly, global fossil fuel prices 
channel. While global economic models show the third 
channel may actually be very important, this subject is 
not discussed in this report because it does not originate 
from the distorted international competitiveness of firms 
due to asymmetric carbon prices. 
162 PMR, Chile, accessed August 10, 2015, http://www.thepmr.org/country/chile-0. 
163 World Bank, Decarbonizing Development: Three Steps Toward a Zero Carbon, 2015.
164 Arik Levinson, “Offshoring Pollution: Is the United States Increasingly Importing Polluting Goods?,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Vol 4, Issue 1 
(2010): 63–83; Josh Ederington & Arik Levinson & Jenny Minier, 2005. “Footloose and Pollution-Free,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press,  
vol. 87(1), pages 92-99.; Levinson, A., and Taylor, M.S. (2008), Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect. International Economic Review 49: 223-54.
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166 Burniaux, J.-M.; Martins, J. Oliveira (2000). “Carbon Emission Leakages: A General Equilibrium View”. OECD Working Paper No. 242.; Sinn, H. W. (2008). “Public 
policies against global warming” (PDF). International Tax and Public Finance 15 (4): 360–394; Elliott, J., I. Foster, S. Kortum, T. Munson, F. Pérez Cervantes, and 
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Different channels of carbon leakage Box 7 
The output, or short-term competitiveness, channel operates when higher carbon emission costs force firms 
to reduce the utilization of their production facilities in jurisdictions covered by carbon pricing, to the benefit 
of plants located elsewhere that are not covered by carbon pricing.165  
The investment, or long-term competitiveness, channel operates if different carbon prices in different 
jurisdictions affect investment decisions relating to choice of location (country). Existing plants in jurisdictions 
with a carbon price may first reduce investment in maintenance to sustain output levels, and eventually close. 
Companies may prefer to relocate to jurisdictions without a carbon price.
Three channels of transferring emissions leakageFigure 13 
The third channel of carbon leakage, the fossil fuel pricing channel, operates if climate policies in some 
countries were to reduce global demand for fossil fuels, which would in turn depress their global prices, 
thereby leading to a rebound in demand elsewhere and a subsequent increase in emissions.166 
 1. Output: 
  short-term  
  competitiveness channel
 firms facing a carbon price lose market share to those without
 2. Investments: 
  long-term  
  competiveness channel
 new investment is preferentially located in  
 regions without a carbon price
 3. Fossil fuel 
  pricing channel
 carbon price causes drop in domestic demand for fossil fuels    
   lower fossil fuel prices    
   increase in demand for fossil fuels elsewhere in the world 
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3.4
HOW TO ASSESS  
THE RISK OF  
CARBON LEAKAGE? 
Carbon leakage only exists if the decision to relocate 
output and/or investment can be directly attributed to 
differences in carbon prices and, in turn, leads to an 
increase in emissions somewhere abroad where carbon 
prices are lower. In other words, causality needs to 
be established. Carbon leakage therefore needs to be 
assessed against what would have happened if carbon 
prices had been similar. 
In reality, firms change location of production 
and investments every day, motivated by a variety of 
idiosyncratic factors discussed above. It is difficult 
to attribute such decisions to a single factor—like 
the increase of a carbon price. Furthermore, the real 
reasons for shifting production or investments are a 
firm’s private knowledge. Firms always strategically 
select the information they share with governments and 
the public. 
The risk of carbon leakage is often debated even before 
the implementation of carbon pricing instruments. 
The risk of carbon leakage can be assessed before a 
certain policy is introduced (“ex ante”) or a few years 
after its implementation, allowing empirical evidence 
to be collected (“ex post”). These two complementary 
approaches to assessing leakage are illustrated in Figure 14.
Ex-ante modeling suggests a wide range of potential 
leakage rates.167 Economy-wide models tend to find 
leakage rates in the region of 5–20 percent (meaning that 
for every 1,000 kg of reduced emissions in jurisdictions 
with a carbon price, emissions are expected to increase by 
50–200 kg in other jurisdictions)— still yielding a net 
reduction. The results were found for a blend of sectors, 
more and less heavily exposed to carbon leakage. However, 
in the economy, when some sectors lose market share and 
employment, others gain. Leakage rates for individual 
sectors therefore differ. The range of leakage rates 
estimated by single-sector, partial equilibrium models is 
much wider: rates vary from just a few percentage points to 
rates even exceeding 100 percent (meaning that emissions 
in other jurisdictions are expected to increase by more than 
the emission reduction achieved in a jurisdiction with a 
Typically 5-15%
Wide range (0-100%+); 
but typically higher than 
GE studies
Economy-wide (CGE) Sector-specific (PE)
No causal relationship 
 between CO2 price and loss 
of market share
Econometric
Theoretical (ex-ante)
Assessments of carbon leakage
Empirical (ex-post)
Ex-ante and ex-post assessments of carbon leakageFigure 14 
Significant differences within and between models
Source: Authors, based on Vivid Economics 
Note: CGE = Computable General Equilibrium (model); PE = Partial Equilibrium (model). 
167 See the comprehensive review of the ex-ante and ex-post studies on carbon leakage in the forthcoming: Partnership for Market Readiness, Carbon leakage: 
theory, evidence and policy design, World Bank.
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carbon price). However, such models tend to focus on the 
sectors that are particularly vulnerable to carbon leakage. 
The different findings of the various modeling approaches 
are also explained by the diversity of the underlying 
assumptions and data, meaning that the results can only be 
duly compared if they are presented in a transparent way.
Ex-post studies are based on empirical assessments 
of existing schemes (mainly carbon taxes in individual 
EU countries and the EU ETS), using econometric 
approaches to try and establish a causal relationship 
between carbon pricing and leakage. The results of ex-
post assessments consistently indicate that so far there 
is very little evidence that carbon prices have caused 
any significant carbon leakage and, least in Europe.168 
However, it is important to recognize that the absence of 
evidence to the contrary does not necessarily indicate that 
carbon leakage has not occurred and will not occur in the 
future. Several factors could explain the above results: 
 – The risk of leakage is negligible because emission costs 
represent only a small fraction of production costs 
and/or other factors are more important determinants 
of a firm’s production and location decisions; 
 – Carbon prices in the existing schemes have been too 
low to have an impact;
 – Mitigation measures worked—free allowances, for 
example, have successfully neutralized the leakage risk;
 – Methodological challenges have distorted the 
results because of the relatively short period that 
carbon pricing has been in existence and the limited 
geographical coverage of the schemes that could 
be studied for a longer period of time (almost all 
empirical studies focus on the EU countries).
The next section discusses when it may be justified to 
provide assistance to firms to mitigate the risk of leakage. 
3.5
WHICH FIRMS NEED  
ASSISTANCE TO PREVENT  
LEAKAGE AND WHEN? 
In the presence of fragmented policies and different 
carbon costs, the risk of carbon leakage justifies giving 
assistance to the exposed firms and sectors. Policy makers 
usually face strong pressures from affected vested interest 
groups to shield them from the impact of carbon prices, 
and need to ascertain whose claims are legitimate and 
who is just seeking windfall gains. 
Three criteria are typically used to identify the sectors 
that are exposed to the risk of carbon leakage:
1. Level of carbon price (capturing the impact of carbon 
prices), which determines the magnitude of costs 
associated with emissions; 
2. Emission intensity (another measure of the impact 
of carbon prices), which determines the cost increase 
that can be attributed to carbon pricing, including 
direct on-site emission costs and indirect emission 
costs passed on through electricity price increases; 
3. Trade intensity (capturing the exposure to carbon 
prices), which is a proxy for the ability of a firm or 
sector to pass on a cost increase to consumers without 
losing significant market share. Absent trade, or the 
potential to trade, firms covered by carbon pricing are 
insulated from uncovered competitors and the risk of 
carbon leakage should be small. 
168 Johanna Arlinghaus, Impacts of Carbon Prices on Indicators of Competitiveness: A Review of Empirical Findings, OECD Environment Working Papers, 2015; 
Abrell, J., G. Zachmann andA. Ndoye (2011), “Assessing the impact of the EU ETS using firm level data,” Bruegel Working Paper, 2011/08; Silvia Albrizio et 
al., Do Environmental Policies Matter for Productivity Growth? Insights from New Cross-Country Measures of Environmental Policies; Ralf Martin et al., “On the 
Empirical Content of Carbon Leakage Criteria in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme,” Ecological Economics Vol 105 (September 2014): 78–88; The New 
Climate Economy, 2014; Florens Flues and Benjamin Johannes Lutz, Competitiveness Impacts of the German Electricity Tax, OECD Environment Working Papers 
(May 2015); Sartor, O. (2012), Carbon leakage in the primary aluminium sector: what evidence after 6 ½ years of the EU ETS? CDC Climate Research Working 
Paper 2012-12; Sartor, O. and T. Spencer (2013), An Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Carbon Leakage in Poland; Barker, T., S. Junankar, H. Pollitt and P. 
Summerton (2007), “Carbon leakage from unilateral Environmental Tax Reforms in Europe, 1995–2005,” Energy Policy, 35(12), 6281–6292, Chan, H. , S. Li, 
and F. Zhang (2012), “Firm competitiveness and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme,” World Bank Working Paper; Cummins, M. (2012), EU ETS 
market interactions: a multiple hypothesis testing approach, Mimeo, Dublin City University Business School; Ellerman, A., F. Convery, and C. De Perthuis (2010), 
Pricing Carbon: The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, Cambridge University Press; Graichen, V., K. Schumacher, F. Matthes, L. Mohr, V. Duscha, J. 
Schleich, and J. Diekmann (2008), Impacts of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on the industrial competitiveness in Germany: final draft report prepared under the 
UFOPLAN, Berlin; Lacombe, R. (2008), “Economic Impact of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme : Evidence from the Refining Sector,” Thesis for the 
Degree of MTech, Massachussetts Institute of Technology. 
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The full picture can be obtained when these three 
criteria are considered together rather than in isolation. 
In the California Cap-and-Trade Program, leakage 
assistance is determined by a combination of emission 
intensity and trade intensity, and, in the period 2018–20, 
sectors will receive different levels of leakage assistance 
according to their level of exposure to leakage. However, 
some instruments, such as the EU ETS (in its current 
phase) and the proposed carbon tax in South Africa, 
offer support to entities that are deemed trade exposed, 
even if they are not carbon-intensive. 
It is best to assess the carbon leakage risk exposure 
of entities at the sector rather than the firm level. This 
approach avoids rewarding firms that are more emissions-
intensive than their competitors and prevents firms from 
changing sales patterns in order to satisfy trade exposure 
tests.
The impact of carbon and trade intensity can be 
further fine-tuned by considering: (i) the price sensitivity 
of consumers; (ii) the degree of competition within the 
industrial sector in question; (iii) the availability and 
cost of abatement options; (iv) carbon pricing (implicit 
and explicit) in other jurisdictions (the main trading 
partners), and (v) the carbon intensity of production in 
other jurisdictions. In sum, exposed sectors are those that 
are carbon-intensive, burdened with costly abatement 
options, and exposed to international trade with 
jurisdictions that do not charge their firms for emissions. 
However, the lack of data and the accompanying 
administrative burden often prevent the use of these 
criteria for more targeted assistance.
Assistance should be narrowed over time, as it 
can otherwise have undesirable fiscal and economic 
consequences and possibly undermine the core objective 
of a policy by maintaining support for carbon-intensive 
firms. However, when carbon pricing is introduced for 
the first time, providing broad support to all sectors 
is sometimes necessary to gain public and political 
acceptance. It can be gradually limited and better 
targeted over time as acceptance increases and more 
relevant data become available. 
3.6
HOW TO ASSIST EXPOSED AND  
VULNERABLE SECTORS? 
Once the risk of leakage has been determined to be 
significant for certain sectors, governments can assist 
the affected firms in several ways. They can assist in 
mitigating the social and economic impact of the sector’s 
decline, for instance, by retraining workers. Alternatively, 
governments can lower the risk of leakage through special 
measures— including integrated assistance measures that 
are included in the design of a carbon pricing instrument 
and complementary measures, which are not part of the 
carbon pricing instrument’s design. 
3.6.1
Integrated assistance measures
Integrated measures have been the generally preferred 
approach to date. Directly incorporating measures that 
protect against leakage in the carbon pricing legislative 
package transparently addresses leakage concerns and 
can help secure the necessary political support for the 
policy. Broadly speaking, six distinct types of integrated 
measures can be observed, three of which involve free 
allowance allocations:
 – Free allowance allocations, based on: 
 – Grandfathering: firms receive free allowances 
directly related to their historical emissions (e.g., 
EU ETS Phases I and II, the Republic of Korea’s 
ETS in all but three sectors, Kazakhstan ETS 
Phases I and II, and most sectors in the pilot 
ETSs of Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei, 
Shanghai and Tianjin);
 – Fixed sector benchmarking (FSB): firms receive free 
allowances related to their historical production 
and a product-specific benchmark of emission 
intensity of the whole sector (EU ETS Phase III)
 – Output-based allocation (OBA): firms receive 
free allowances related to their actual production 
and a product-specific benchmark of emission 
intensity of the whole sector (e.g., California, 
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea in three 
sectors, and Shenzhen);
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 – Administrative exemptions: exempting some 
emissions or sectors/firms from the carbon pricing 
instrument, or setting reduced rates for them (e.g., 
a number of carbon taxes in EU countries and South 
Africa’s proposed carbon tax);
 – Rebates: providing subsidies to industry (direct 
rebates) or reducing other taxes paid by the exposed 
industry (indirect), often by an equivalent amount 
(e.g., the U.K. climate change levy and the Swedish 
Nitrogen Oxide charge);
 – Border carbon adjustments (BCAs): imposing 
emission costs at the border on importers of carbon-
intensive goods and/or providing a rebate to firms 
exporting to third countries, unless those countries 
have an equivalent carbon pricing regime.
The various assistance measures each have their own 
relative merits and weaknesses in terms of administrative 
feasibility and costs, effectiveness in leakage prevention, 
and usability as an incentive to reduce emissions. They 
are sometimes combined in one legislative package, where 
different forms of assistance are given to different sectors. 
Exemptions perform most poorly in terms of 
abatement incentives, but are easy to implement. They 
may be appropriate to ensure political support so that 
carbon pricing survives the infancy stage.
Grandfathering may be appropriate when a scheme 
is in its early stages, where the need to tackle other 
administrative challenges may make benchmarking 
approaches complex, or where there is a desire to provide 
one-off compensation to firms, even if they are not at risk 
of leakage. Grandfathering entails perverse incentives to 
increase emissions, unless firms expect that it will be 
soon replaced with benchmark-based assistance.
Of the free allocation approaches, those that use 
benchmarking (either OBA or FSB) generally perform 
better by most criteria than those that provide free 
allowances on a grandfathered basis. By breaking the 
link between a firm’s own historical emission levels and 
its free allowance allocation, the risk of rent-seeking is 
reduced. The additional administrative costs incurred to 
calculate the benchmarks, and in the case of OBA also 
to update output data, are higher for the benchmarking 
approaches, but are manageable. 
There is a trade-off between the two benchmarking 
approaches. OBA may be more effective at preventing 
leakage but may also compromise the environmental 
integrity of the carbon pricing instrument, unless it is 
designed with additional environmental safeguards. This 
is particularly true if OBA is applied to sectors that are 
not exposed to leakage. 
BCAs arguably perform best in terms of environmental 
integrity, but face political, administrative,169 and possibly 
also legal challenges. BCAs effectively extend the carbon 
pricing regime to entities outside the implementing 
jurisdiction. Legal considerations will influence any 
design170 but many commentators suggest that these 
considerations will not represent an insurmountable 
barrier.171, 172 World Trade Organization requirements 
might possibly be met if BCAs demonstrate their 
effectiveness at reducing emissions, rather than at 
addressing carbon leakage.173 The political challenges 
may be as great, or greater, than any legal constraints, as 
demonstrated by the experience of the EU in seeking to 
establish a regime that would have extended its ETS to 
cover emissions from all international flights from and to 
Europe. Application of trade measures to climate change 
169 Davie, Bruce F. (1995), Border tax adjustments for environmental excise taxes: the US experience, Mimeo Washington DC, US Treasury Department.
170 Laborde, D. and S. Msangi (2011), “Biofuels, Environment, and Food: The Story Gets More Complicated,” International Food Policy and Research Institute, Wash-
ington, DC, www.ifpri.org/node/8439.
171 Condon, M. and A. Ignaciuk (2013), “Border Carbon Adjustment and International Trade: A Literature Review”, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers, No. 
2013/06, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3xn25b386c-en.
172 Cosbey, A., S. Droege, C. Fischer, J. Reinaud, J. Stephenson, L. Weischer and P. Wooders (2012), “A Guide for the Concerned: Guidance on the elaboration and 
implementation of border carbon adjustment,” ENTWINED/International Institute of Sustainable Development, Stockholm. 
173 Stéphanie Monjon and Philippe Quirion, “A Border Adjustment for the EU ETS: Reconciling WTO Rules and Capacity to Tackle Carbon Leakage,” Climate Policy 
Vol 11, Issue 5 (September 2011): 1212–1225.
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regulation remains largely untested and risky. Trade 
disputes can spill over to many areas of international 
relations, making BCA a very expensive policy for all 
parties concerned. Border adjustment measures appear 
more feasible when introduced by a coalition of partners 
who account for a significant share of world trade.174 
Moreover, considerable administrative challenges arise 
from the fact that the legislator introducing BCA has 
no jurisdictional access to third-party companies to 
ensure accurate measurements of emissions. Adequate 
monitoring, reporting, and third-party verification of 
emissions has proved essential for the proper functioning 
of carbon markets.
A more technical discussion of the integrated 
assistance measures is presented in Annex II.
3.6.2
Complementary leakage  
mitigation measures
Complementary measures tend to have a less 
immediate impact on leakage and are more challenging 
to design in a way that flexes in value with the carbon 
price. They can reduce the carbon cost burden faced by 
sectors exposed to leakage through grants; tax incentives; 
and financial assistance for emission reduction projects 
for firms in leakage-exposed sectors or for R&D of low-
emissions technologies applicable in leakage-exposed 
sectors. For example, under Phase III of the EU ETS, 
member states can compensate firms for indirect emission 
costs using national resources via state aid schemes. 
Both the EU and New Zealand provide research and 
development funding to affected sectors. However, the 
link between these measures and leakage prevention may 
not be strong.
3.6.3
Ensuring targeted and  
effective leakage  
assistance measures
Experience suggests that to successfully address 
competitiveness and leakage concerns requires that 
assistance be targeted at those sectors where the risk 
of leakage is significant. The assistance measures 
implemented should be chosen after considering multiple 
criteria, such as effectiveness in leakage prevention and 
administrative feasibility, as indicated in Table 4 in 
Annex II. If this is a politically difficult process, assistance 
measures should be reviewed periodically and adjusted as 
more jurisdictions apply similar policies, and additional 
knowledge is gained on this subject. 
Studies suggest that leakage prevention assistance has 
not always been necessary to maintain the competitiveness 
of firms affected by these policies.175 A number of analyses 
found no difference in output or employment between 
firms that faced the full carbon price and those that were 
fully or partially exempt.176 However, this finding may 
not necessarily apply to higher carbon prices.
The ultimate solution to carbon leakage is 
international cooperation, which would harmonize 
carbon price signals across all jurisdictions. It would 
remove the underlying cause of leakage and therefore 
reduce the need for assistance measures. Nonetheless, as 
pointed out above, more empirical evidence is needed 
on the impact of internationally harmonized but high 
carbon prices in less developed, low-income countries. 
The benefits of international cooperation and the 
fundamental role of carbon pricing instruments are 
discussed in the next section.
174 Nordhaus, B. (2015), “Climate Clubs : Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy,” American Economic Review, 105(4), 1339–1370. 
175 Johanna Arlinghaus, Impacts of Carbon Prices on Indicators of Competitiveness: A Review of Empirical Findings, OECD Environment Working Papers, 2015.
176 Niels Anger and Ulrich Oberndorfer, “Firm Performance and Employment in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: An Empirical Assessment for Germany,” Energy 
Policy Vol 36, Issue 1 (2008): 12–22; Ralf Martin, Ulrich J. Wagner, and Laure B. de Preux, The Impacts of Climate Change Levy on Business: Evidence from 
Microdata, CEP Discussion Paper, 2009; Ralf Martin et al., “Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme,” American Economic Review Vol 104, Issue 8 (2014): 2482–2508; Flues and Lutz, Competitiveness Impacts of the German Electricity Tax, OECD 
Environment Working Papers (May 2015).
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A s outlined in section 2, new national and subnational carbon pricing instruments have emerged since 
2012 in a bottom-up process. Countries are defining 
their mitigation efforts in INDCs. These INDCs will 
inform future action on carbon pricing. Section 3 has 
shown that competiveness and carbon leakage are serious 
concerns in a world of uncoordinated, fragmented action 
on carbon pricing. Policy tools are available to manage 
these risks but ultimately international cooperation 
will be essential to realizing the full potential of carbon 
pricing.
This section explores the broader role of international 
cooperation in achieving the 2°C mitigation target 
in a cost-efficient manner. Because of the unequal 
distribution of wealth and abatement potential around 
the world, all countries would benefit from cooperation.
Some countries can afford to reduce GHG emissions but 
have already exploited most of their low-cost abatement 
options, while others have many low cost low-carbon 
development opportunities, but lack the resources 
to harness them. Carbon pricing and climate finance 
instruments are important facilitators of cooperation, 
as these are the primary mechanisms through which 
international finance can be transferred between 
countries. Through carbon pricing instruments, a 
portion of the resulting cost savings in countries that 
avoid the most expensive abatement measures can 
be converted to financial transfers and drive low-
carbon growth in the lower-income countries, which 
might otherwise lack the resources to modernize their 
economies, create jobs in low-carbon sectors, and reduce 
poverty in a sustainable manner. Rewards such as these 
financial transfers between countries and penalties, 
for example, border carbon adjustments, are necessary 
instruments to overcome incentives to “free-ride” on the 
efforts of others, something that prevents a cooperative 
solution. They align incentives between countries, avoid 
fragmentation, and enable harnessing of the common 
benefits from cooperation.177 
177 Nordhaus, W., “Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy”, American Economic Review, 105(4): 1339–1370, 2015. 
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The natural starting point to estimate the potential 
cost savings through cooperation and associated 
financial transfers would be the INDCs. However, as 
some INDCs have not yet been submitted, it is too 
soon to model the cost savings that could be achieved 
on the basis of INDCs. Therefore, this section follows 
an alternative approach that illustrates a possible range 
of INDCs using so-called effort-sharing scenarios. Based 
on the modeling of these scenarios from various leading 
literature sources, ranges of cost savings and associated 
resource transfers are presented. While these ranges are 
broad, reflecting different impacts from the various effort 
sharing scenarios and models used, the possible savings 
and resource transfers are nonetheless large in all cases, 
across a diverse range of assumptions. This demonstrates 
the robustness of the conclusions of this section and 
highlights the indispensable role of international 
cooperation, through carbon pricing and climate finance 
instruments, in mobilizing resources at the scale needed 
to stabilize the climate.
4.1
INCENTIVES FOR  
COOPERATION  
ON CLIMATE MITIGATION 
The magnitude of cost savings that can be achieved 
through cooperation depends mainly on the initial 
distribution of mitigation efforts among countries, 
the stringency of the emission reduction targets, the 
differential of mitigation costs between countries, and 
the size of the coalition of countries pursuing climate 
action. Although all countries ultimately benefit from 
cooperation, each country will benefit to a different 
extent—some will be recipients of resource transfers, 
while others will transfer resources to other countries.
The distribution of mitigation efforts among 
countries reflects national circumstances, political 
realities, economic possibilities, and strategic interests. 
International climate negotiations recognize that countries 
should participate in climate mitigation in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities, taking into account their 
specific social and economic circumstances.178 Once all 
INDCs have been submitted, they will reveal the de facto 
initial distribution of mitigation efforts. 
The INDC effort-sharing outcome can be compared 
with the outcome of a process purely based on the 
principle of efficiency: a least-cost approach, which calls 
for emission reductions to be achieved wherever it is 
cheapest to do so, without regard for political or other 
constraints. As the INDC process is still underway, it 
is too early to make such a comparison. However, 
regardless of the distribution of mitigation efforts that 
will emerge from the INDCs, it is likely that the cost 
burden of climate change mitigation can be reduced. 
This is because the actual emission reductions can be 
achieved either through domestic actions alone or 
through a combination of domestic and cooperative 
actions undertaken jointly by several countries. 
178 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992.
» The main reward for  
global cooperation on  
climate change lies in the 
savings that can be gained 
on the costs of limiting  
the global temperature  
increase to 2°C. « 
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Academic literature can give an insight into the extent 
to which cooperation can help reduce the cost burden. 
It compares effort-sharing outcomes based on the least-
cost approach with effort-sharing approaches based on 
normative principles, reflecting different stakeholders’ 
preferences on how the effort should be distributed 
according to principles such as fairness and equity. Some 
examples of these normative effort-sharing approaches 
are equal costs per GDP, per GDP convergence, and 
per capita convergence.179 By definition, these effort-
sharing approaches are more expensive than (or at least 
as expensive as) the least-cost approach. 
The cost savings that can be achieved by moving from 
various initial effort-sharing approaches to a least-cost 
scenario through cooperation are presented in Table 2. 
Although these estimates are based on effort-sharing 
approaches that may be different from the outcome of the 
INDC process, they can be considered as a proxy of the 
cost savings that can be achieved through cooperation. 
This is justified because the normative principles used 
in the academic research presented in Table 2 are also, 
implicitly or explicitly, adopted in the INDC process.
According to this academic research, cooperation can 
reduce the global costs of meeting a long-term climate 
target by about 6–67 percent.180 The magnitude of these 
cost savings depends on the assumed distribution of the 
mitigation effort among countries compared to a least-
cost scenario, as discussed above. In general, the largest 
global cost savings are expected if the distribution of 
effort is not based on low-cost mitigation options. This 
is highlighted in Table 2, which shows that cooperation 
is more valuable if the initial effort-sharing approach 
is based on the per capita convergence principle rather 
than on effort-sharing approaches that take global 
mitigation opportunities into account (that is, the equal 
costs per GDP and per GDP convergence approaches). 
Moreover, a study by Clarke et al. (2009), which is 
quoted by the IPCC, estimates that the potential cost 
savings are larger under a scenario where only a few 
countries take mitigation action, as delayed mitigation 
by the other countries results in higher global mitigation 
costs (see Table 2).181 Furthermore, research has found 
that lower relative cost savings are obtained for more 
ambitious global emission reduction targets, such as 
the 450 ppm CO2e scenario,
182 compared with less 
ambitious targets, such as the 550 ppm CO2e scenario 
(Table 2). The main explanation for this finding is that in 
order to achieve substantial global emission reductions, 
both developed and developing countries have to use 
relatively expensive abatement measures. As the costs 
of achieving emission reductions in industrialized and 
developing countries converge, the benefits of shifting 
the mitigation effort from one country to another are 
lower. 
179 Equal costs per GDP – this approach assumes that the mitigation effort is divided among countries so that all countries have equal mitigation costs as a share of 
GDP. This burden differentiation model takes into account countries’ mitigation opportunities and their ability to pay for mitigation. Per GDP convergence – this 
approach is based on the convergence of emissions per unit of GDP, which is an indicator of the carbon efficiency of a country. Under this burden differentiation 
model, countries with lower carbon efficiencies (that is, higher emissions per unit of GDP) are required to make deeper emission reductions than countries with 
higher carbon efficiencies (that is, lower emissions per unit of GDP). Typically, these deep emission reductions can be achieved at a relatively low abatement 
cost, as countries with low carbon efficiency generally have numerous low-cost mitigation opportunities. Per capita convergence – this approach distributes the 
 mitigation effort among countries so that the emissions per capita of countries converge over time to a common level. This model is based on the egalitarian 
principle, where all citizens have equal rights to “use” the atmosphere.
180 Savings are reported on a net basis, i.e. are calculated as a sum of avoided mitigation costs in some countries after transfers plus a sum of surplus of other 
 countries resulting from transfers after additional mitigation costs have been incurred.
181 Leon Clarke, Kejun Jiang, Keigo Akimoto, Mustafa Babiker, Geoffrey Blanford, Karen Fisher, J. Vanden, Jean-Charles Hourcade, Volker Krey, Elmar Kriegler, 
Andreas Loschel, David McCollum, Sergey Paltsev, Steven Rose, Priyadarshi R. Shukla, Massimo Tavoni, Bob van der Zwaan and Detlef P. van Vuuren, “Assess-
ing Transformation Pathways,” Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Chapter 6 (2014): 413–510, quoting Leon Clarke, Jae Edmonds, Volker Krey, Richard Richels, Steven Rose, and 
Massimo Tavoni, “International climate policy architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios,” Energy Economics, Vol 31 (2009): 64–81. 
182 A long-term 450 ppm CO2e target is “likely” (>66%) to limit the global temperature rise to 2°C. 
 Note: 
a Costs are expressed as share of GDP in the target year.
b Source: Andries Hof, Corjan Brink, Angelica Mendoza Beltran, Michel den Elzen, 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Targets for 2030. Conditions for an EU 
Target of 40%, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2012.
c Source: Shinichiro Fujimori, Toshihiko Masui, and Yuzuru Matsuoka, 
“Gains from Emission Trading under Multiple Stabilization Targets and 
 Technological Constraints,” Energy Economics, Vol 48 (2015): 306–315. 
d Costs are expressed as welfare changes. 
e Leon Clarke, Jae Edmonds, Volker Krey, Richard Richels, Steven Rose, and 
Massimo Tavoni, “International climate policy architectures: Overview of the 
EMF 22 International Scenarios,” Energy Economics, Vol 31 (2009): 64–81. 
f This scenario assumes that Annex I countries (without Russia) take imme-
diate mitigation actions, Brazil, Russia, India and China participate in 2030 
and the rest of the world participates in 2050. 
g Source: Heinz Welsch and Christoph Böhringer, “Contraction and 
 Convergence of Carbon Emissions: An Intertemporal Multi-Region CGE 
Analysis,” Journal of Policy Modeling Vol 26, Issue 1 (2004): 21–39.  
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Cost savings from cooperation on a regional level vary 
significantly, as demonstrated in Figure 15, which shows 
the absolute and relative cost savings for an approach where 
the effort-sharing uses equal costs per GDP (chosen for 
illustration only). In this figure, the largest circle represents 
a 45 percent reduction of mitigation costs in South Asia.183 
The largest $ sign represents US$39 billion in absolute cost 
savings in Europe. While the size of the cost savings varies 
widely, all regions nonetheless benefit from cooperation. It is 
important to highlight that Figure 15 presents the regional 
cost savings calculated on the basis of a single model study by 
Hof et al. (2012) and on only one effort-sharing approach. 
The cost savings calculated by other studies may not be 
identical, as these other studies may use different models, 
based on different underlying assumptions and different 
effort-sharing approaches. However, in general, studies show 
that all countries benefit from international cooperation as 
it leads to a more efficient use of global resources. 
Source
Regional 
scope
Target 
year
Distribution of  
mitigation efforts  
across countries 
Long-term  
climate target
Global cost savings  
from international  
cooperation (in %) 
Hof et al. (2012)a
Global,  
26 regions 
2030
Equal costs per GDP 450 ppm CO2e 16%
b 
Per capita convergence 450 ppm CO2e 32% 
Fujimori et al. (2015)c 
Global,  
17 regions
2050
Per capita convergence
450 ppm CO2e 16%
d 
550 ppm CO2e 35%
Per GDP convergence
450 ppm CO2e 6%
550 ppm CO2e 19%
Clarke et al. (2009)e
Global,  
10 regions
2100 Fragmented actionf
450 ppm CO2e and 
550 ppm CO2e
33–67%
Böhringer and Welsch 
(2004)g
Global, 
12 regions 
2050 Per capita convergence
25% below 1990 
levels 
59%h 
EBRD and Grantham 
Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the 
Environment (2011)i
Economies 
in transitionj
2050
Uniform: 80% below 2005 
levels by all  countries
500 ppm CO2e 47%
k 
OECD (2010)l
Annex I 
onlym
2020
Uniform: 20% below 1990 
levels by all Annex I countries
n/a 13%n 
2050
Uniform: 50% below 1990 
levels by all Annex I countries
n/a 7% 
Literature overview of global cost savings from international cooperationTable 2 
183 The exact definition of this region depends on the calculation model used. South Asia includes India, and may include, among other countries, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Nepal and Pakistan. Source: Tavoni, M., Kriegler, E., Aboumahboub, T., Calvin, K., De Maere, G., Jewell, J., Kober, T., Lucas, P., Luderer, G., McCollum, D., Marangoni, G., 
Riahi, K., and van Vuuren, D., Limits Special Issue on Durban Platform scenarios: The distribution of the major economies’ effort in the Durban platform scenarios, 2013.
h Costs are expressed as welfare changes. 
i Source: EBRD and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment, The Low Carbon Transition, 2011. 
j Eastern and South-eastern Europe, Baltic countries, Russia, former Soviet 
Union, Central Asia (excluding China) and Turkey. 
k The mitigation cost without cooperation was calculated in this study using 
a “limited trade” scenario, in which 20% of the emission reductions can be 
imported from other regions and 80% needs to be achieved through domestic 
actions. Costs are expressed as share of business-as-usual GDP in net 
 present value for period 2010–50. 
l Source: OECD, Towards Global Carbon Pricing, 2010. 
m As the scope of this study is limited to Annex I countries only, the cost increase 
relates to linking Annex I countries. If the scope would be extended to also  include 
non-Annex I countries, the cost increase would most likely be much higher. 
n Costs are expressed as welfare changes measured by income equivalent 
variation in target year.
 Note: 
a Costs are expressed as share of GDP in the target year.
b Source: Andries Hof, Corjan Brink, Angelica Mendoza Beltran, Michel den Elzen, 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Targets for 2030. Conditions for an EU 
Target of 40%, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2012.
c Source: Shinichiro Fujimori, Toshihiko Masui, and Yuzuru Matsuoka, 
“Gains from Emission Trading under Multiple Stabilization Targets and 
 Technological Constraints,” Energy Economics, Vol 48 (2015): 306–315. 
d Costs are expressed as welfare changes. 
e Leon Clarke, Jae Edmonds, Volker Krey, Richard Richels, Steven Rose, and 
Massimo Tavoni, “International climate policy architectures: Overview of the 
EMF 22 International Scenarios,” Energy Economics, Vol 31 (2009): 64–81. 
f This scenario assumes that Annex I countries (without Russia) take imme-
diate mitigation actions, Brazil, Russia, India and China participate in 2030 
and the rest of the world participates in 2050. 
g Source: Heinz Welsch and Christoph Böhringer, “Contraction and 
 Convergence of Carbon Emissions: An Intertemporal Multi-Region CGE 
Analysis,” Journal of Policy Modeling Vol 26, Issue 1 (2004): 21–39.  
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184 Parry, I., Veung, C., and Heine, D., How much carbon pricing is in countries’ own interests? The critical role of co-benefits, 2014. 
It is important to note that these studies only 
take into account the direct costs of GHG emission 
mitigation and the resource transfers that enable cost 
savings. The global benefits of avoided climate change 
damages are not considered. Furthermore, co-benefits184 
of mitigation that are not quantified in these studies 
include improvement in human health, energy access, 
and energy security. Cooperation can also strengthen 
trust between countries, reduce the potential for 
conflicts, and facilitate knowledge sharing. 
Illustration of cost savings from international cooperation relative to mitigation costs without cooperation for ten regions by 2030 Figure 15 
Source: Authors, based on Andries Hof, Corjan Brink, Angelica Mendoza 
Beltran, Michel den Elzen, Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Targets for 
2030. Conditions for an EU Target of 40%, PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency, 2012.
Note: Circles represent the relative cost savings, while $ symbols represent 
the size of the absolute cost savings. Absolute cost savings are expressed in 
US dollars and represent the difference between the global mitigation cost in 
a scenario without international cooperation and the global mitigation cost in 
a scenario with international cooperation based on an equal costs per GDP 
effort-sharing approach. Relative cost savings are the absolute cost savings 
expressed as a percentage of global mitigation costs without cooperation. 
For example, the mitigation costs in South Asia without cooperation amount 
to US$9.3 billion, but drop to US$5.1 billion with cooperation. This represents 
absolute cost savings of US$4.2 billion, or 45 percent in relative cost savings. 
The regions were based on the model and do not imply any judgement 
concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance  
of such boundaries. Values are in 2005 US$ per year.
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4.2
REALIZING THE BENEFITS  
OF COOPERATION 
Carbon pricing instruments can mobilize the resources 
needed to achieve cost savings from cooperation in the 
form of financial transfers between countries. Such 
instruments include carbon taxes, ETSs, carbon offset 
instruments as well as different forms of climate finance 
that can be funded by the revenues derived from carbon 
pricing or regular taxes. 
Climate finance involves financial transfers between, 
for example, countries or international investors. It 
can take the form of direct investment in low-carbon 
technologies through grants or concessional loans 
and tax rebates, among other instruments. It can also 
fund readiness activities such as capacity building, 
institutional development, and policy design.185 
Climate finance can help economies prepare for the 
introduction of a carbon price signal by providing the 
upfront funds needed to set up the infrastructure for 
a carbon pricing instrument or by phasing in carbon 
pricing in the form of carbon RBF. 
Furthermore, carbon pricing instruments (carbon 
taxes, ETSs, and carbon offset instruments) have features 
that complement climate finance instruments:
 – Cost discovery: Carbon pricing instruments can 
engage private sector actors to actively search for and 
discover the lowest-cost mitigation options. While 
models can be used to estimate emission mitigation 
costs and identify optimal mitigation strategies, 
these models are based on assumptions made with 
limited information available to modelers at the time 
the model was built. By contrast, the cost discovery 
function of carbon pricing facilitates innovation that 
uncovers mitigation options and costs.
 
 – Flexibility: This is needed to provide policy makers 
with the ability to deal with uncertainties in future 
economic development and emission trajectories. In 
particular, permitting the use of mitigation outcomes 
achieved abroad can provide comfort to policy makers 
who set an ambitious emission reduction target.
 – Resource mobilization and private finance leveraging: 
Achieving ambitious and cost-efficient mitigation 
globally requires significant international financial 
transfers that cannot be mobilized through public 
budgets only. The leveraging of private sector 
financial flows is therefore important, especially for 
developing countries, where low-carbon, capital-
intensive technologies often struggle to compete with 
cheaper, traditional, carbon-intensive technologies. 
Developing countries also have higher sovereign risks, 
which reduce the attractiveness of investments in low-
carbon technologies. Carbon pricing helps overcome 
these issues by providing an economic incentive for 
investors to assume the additional investment risk 
and shift resources from carbon-intensive to low-
carbon technologies. 
Combining and linking up different carbon pricing 
instruments can facilitate financial transfers even further 
(see Box 8).
185 While climate finance is often considered to be a resource flow from developed to developing countries, climate finance can also flow between developing 
 countries or between developed countries. Moreover, climate finance includes financial resources from both the public and private sectors.
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186 Daniel Bodansky, Seth Hoedl, Gilbert Metcalf, Robert Stavins, Facilitating Linkage of Heterogeneous Regional, National, and Sub-National Climate Policies Through 
a Future International Agreement, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 2014.
187 Adelphi (on behalf of the BMUB), Towards a Global Price on Carbon: Pathways for Linking Carbon Pricing Instruments, 2015.
188 The World Bank Networked Carbon Markets (NCM) initiative supports international cooperation. It has a long term vision that is focused on how a future 
 international carbon market could accommodate a ‘patchwork’ of different, domestic climate actions. It is collaborating with a wide range of stakeholders to 
explore the post-2020 services and institutions that might be needed to achieve this, including: an independent assessment framework to establish a shared 
understanding of the climate change mitigation value of a wide range different climate actions; an International Carbon Asset Reserve to support and facilitate 
carbon market related functions; and an International Settlement Platform to track cross-border trades and provide a possible clearing house function. Further 
information is available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/globally-networked-carbon-markets.
Linking of carbon pricing instruments Box 8
There are various ways to combine and link different carbon pricing instruments. For instance, offsets have 
commonly been used under ETSs. A well-known example is the use of CERs and ERUs in the EU ETS. The 
import of offsets up to about 6% of the cumulative cap is allowed under the EU ETS in the period 2008–20. 
Offsets can also be used in carbon taxes. For example, offsets are expected to be permitted for use in the 
scheduled South African carbon tax and CERs can be used in the Mexican carbon tax.
Several countries mention the use of international credits in their INDCs. The use of a common offset 
standard by various ETSs and carbon taxes indirectly links the instruments and helps carbon prices 
converge. Common offset standards such as the CDM, recognized by a wide range of countries, can help 
facilitate this indirect link of instruments and cooperation between countries. Another example of an indirect 
link is the international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol, where the trading of AAUs between 
countries creates implicit links between the countries’ domestic mitigation policies.186 
Directly linking carbon tax instruments may involve different jurisdictions agreeing on (minimum) tax rates. 
Furthermore, it would require a consensus on the rules for transferring tax revenues across borders. ETSs 
and carbon taxes can also be linked directly. An example of a direct link between ETSs is found in the 
California and Québec Cap-and-Trade programs. Another linking variant is where ETS allowances are 
accepted under a carbon tax. Similarly, ETSs can also accept tax credits, which entities liable under a carbon 
tax would receive when paying taxes beyond their obligations. These types of links can be two-way, where 
units from one instrument are accepted in the other instrument and vice versa, or one-way, where only one 
instrument accepts units from the other.187 While harmonization of key design elements can help facilitate 
direct linking, this can be a challenge. Jurisdictions are currently designing and implementing carbon pricing 
instruments that reflect their national circumstances and that are, therefore, not harmonized. The concept of 
“networking” carbon pricing instruments is an alternative to direct linking which reflects this political reality. 
Networking accepts differences in the design and ambition of instruments, and seeks to facilitate cross-
border trade by assigning a value to these differences.188 Another alternative to direct linking is to establish 
quantitative limits on the flows of units between instruments. While this option may restrict overall efficiency 
gains, it is recognized as an important mechanism to ensure that linking supplements domestic action.
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The magnitude and direction of financial transfers 
through economic instruments depend on the initial 
distribution of mitigation efforts. The LIMITS project189 
found that under a scenario compatible with a 2°C 
target,190 the net annual flow of financial resources will 
be US$100–400 billion/year by 2030. By 2050, this net 
flow is estimated to increase to approximately US$400–
2,200 billion/year. 
An illustrative example of the magnitude and direction 
of the financial transfers in 2030 for two different effort-
sharing approaches (equal costs per GDP and per capita 
convergence) are presented in Figure 16. Similar to the 
analysis of cost savings from cooperation, the size and 
direction of financial transfers depend on the effort-
sharing approach adopted, the specific model used, and 
the underlying assumptions. It is important to note that 
these financial transfers are net flows, which take into 
account the difference between inflows and outflows. The 
value of these flows is directly related to the size of the 
cost savings: a large flow (in either direction) is associated 
with a high level of cost savings to a particular region.
The analysis shows that, in general, developing regions 
are recipients of net financial inflows. However, for some 
regions or countries—such as East Asia191, the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), and the former Soviet 
Union—the direction of financial transfers depends on 
the effort-sharing approach selected: 
 – Under the convergence per capita approach, East Asia 
would be transferring finance to other regions, as its 
per capita emissions are relatively high (currently larger 
than the EU), while under the equal costs per GDP 
scenario, East Asia would be a recipient of finance.
 – Energy-exporting regions such as the MENA and the 
former Soviet Union would be transferring finance to 
other jurisdictions under the convergence per capita 
approach, as this approach involves high reduction 
targets for these countries. However, under the equal 
costs per GDP approach, these regions would be 
receiving international finance, as the relatively large 
impact of climate mitigation on fossil fuel trade 
reduces their GDP. As a consequence, this lowers 
their emission reduction targets. 
Financial transfers need to take place even in a future 
where net global GHG emissions will be nil. It is expected 
that some countries will reach zero GHG emissions 
through the achievement of net negative emissions (or 
emission removal) by, for example, reforestation, or 
biomass with CO2 Capture and Storage (bio-CCS), 
which balances other countries’ positive emissions. 
Financial flows are therefore needed to facilitate 
cooperation between these two groups of countries to 
achieve the net zero emissions target. 
In summary, the long-term, global costs of reaching 
the 2°C target can be reduced by cooperation between 
countries. The corollary of this result is that, for a 
given cost figure, countries can achieve larger emission 
reductions through cooperation than through domestic 
actions alone. 
The large-scale international resource transfers will 
be beyond the level of public sector spending, and will 
need to be channeled through a blend of instruments. 
These include carbon pricing instruments such as ETSs, 
carbon taxes, offsets and a combination thereof and 
linkages between them, as well as innovative hybrid 
instruments, such as variations of results-based climate 
finance. Climate finance and carbon pricing instruments 
will be essential in leveraging these financial transfers 
and enabling cooperation to mitigate climate change.
189 The LIMITS project is one of the most complete studies to date of regional resource transfers. LIMITS compares six different models that, among other outcomes, 
evaluate financial transfers under various scenarios. Financial transfers are calculated as the volume of emission reductions transferred multiplied by a carbon 
price. For further details, see Massimo Tavoni, Elmar Kriegler, Keywan Riahi, Detlef P. van Vuuren, Tino Aboumahboub, Alex Bowen, Katherine Calvin, Emanuele 
Campiglio, Tom Kober, Jessica Jewell, Gunnar Luderer, Giacomo Marangoni, David McCollum, Mariësse van Sluisveld, Anne Zimmer, Bob van der Zwaan. (2015) 
“Post-2020 climate agreements in the major economies assessed in the light of global models”. Nature Climate Change 119–126 (2015) and http://www.
feem-project.net/limits/. 
190 This scenario assumes a GHG concentration of 450 ppm CO2e by 2100. 
191 The exact definition of this region depends on the calculation model used. East Asia includes China, and may include, among other countries, Cambodia, 
 Mongolia, North Korea and Vietnam. Source: Tavoni, M., Kriegler, E., Aboumahboub, T., Calvin, K., De Maere, G., Jewell, J., Kober, T., Lucas, P., Luderer, G., 
 McCollum, D., Marangoni, G., Riahi, K., and van Vuuren, D., Limits Special Issue on Durban Platform scenarios: The distribution of the major economies’ effort in  
the Durban platform scenarios, 2013.
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Illustration of approximate regional financial flows required to achieve GHG mitigation in line  
with a 2°C target at global least costs by 2030 
Figure 16 
 Net outflow  Net inflow
Note: Regional mitigation contributions are determined by either convergence of per capita emissions (top map) or equal costs per GDP (bottom map). The 
area of the triangles scales with absolute resource flows. The largest triangle (Sub-Saharan Africa in top map) depicts a value of US$95 billion and the smallest 
triangle (Latin America in bottom map) corresponds to a value of US$0.4 billion. Values are in 2005 US$ per year.
UNDER AN  
EQUAL COSTS  
PER GDP  
APPROACH
UNDER A  
CONVERGENCE  
OF PER CAPITA  
EMISSIONS APPROACH
Source: Authors, based on LIMITS database
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ANNEX I 
CONVERSION RATES 
Currency Symbol US$ equivalent
British Pound £ 1.5574
Danish Krone DKK 0.1470
Canadian Dollar CAN$ 0.7664
Chilean Peso CLP 0.0015
Chinese Yuan CNY 0.1635
Euro € 1.0967
Icelandic Krona ISK 0.0074
Japanese Yen ¥ 0.0081
Kazakhstan Tenge KZT 0.0053
Korean Won KRW 0.0009
Mexican Peso MXN 0.0622
New Zealand Dollar NZD 0.6577
Norwegian Krone NOK 0.1218
Polish Zloty PLN 0.2637
South African Rand R 0.0790
Swedish Krona SEK 0.1159
Swiss Franc CHF 1.0392
Currency conversion rates as of August 1, 2015Table 3 
Source: International Monetary Fund, accessed August 6, 2015, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx.
73
ANNEX II 
INTEGRATED ASSISTANCE MEASURES  
TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF LEAKAGE
Leakage 
prevention 
measure
Administrative 
feasibility/cost Leakage prevention
Incentives to 
 reduce emissions
Demand-side 
efficiency 
incentives Other issues
Free allocation: 
Grandfathering 
Relatively easy to 
implement if his-
torical emissions 
data are available
Relatively weak, relying 
on periodic updates of 
free allowances
Diluted by strategic 
gaming by firms
May be 
 preserved
Risk of windfall profits 
and rent-seeking by firms
Free allocation: 
Fixed sector 
benchmarking
Relatively complex 
and risks being 
subject to lobby-
ing, but this can 
be overcome
Relatively weak, relying 
on periodic updates of 
free allowances
Preserved by using 
firm-independent 
benchmarks
May be 
 preserved
Low risk of rent-seeking 
by firms
Free allocation: 
Output-based 
allocations
Relatively com-
plex and risks 
being subject to 
lobbying, but this 
can be overcome
Strong, due to the 
clear and explicit link 
between output and 
allocations, depending 
on which benchmarks 
have been set
Preserved by 
benchmarks, but 
lower predictability 
of overall environ-
mental impact
None if 
applied too 
broadly
Low risk of rent-seeking 
by firms
Administrative 
exemptions
Easy to 
 implement
Strong, but inefficient 
firms will be artificially 
shielded from competi-
tion from efficient ones
None None No risk of windfall profits
Rebates Depends on the 
choice
Strong if rebates 
are linked to output 
(like output-based 
allocations), but weaker 
if rebates are in the form 
of lump-sum transfers
Strong if rebates 
are not linked to 
emission intensity
Stronger for 
lump-sum 
 rebates than 
for those 
linked to 
output
 
Border carbon 
adjustments 
(BCAs)
Very complex  
and 
administratively 
costly
Strong Preserved and may 
also be extended 
to firms outside the 
direct scope of the 
policy
Yes Significant political and 
possibly legal challenges; 
lower risk when 
introduced by a coalition 
with market power
Pros and cons of various leakage assistance measures Table 4 
Source: Vivid Economics: Technical note for the World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness 2015.
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192 Economic impacts similar to those of free allowances under a cap-and-trade scheme can be achieved by transferable tax exemptions under a carbon tax. For 
example, carbon tax equivalents of free allowance allocations have been described in Pezzey (1992) and Pezzey & Jotzo (2012). Source: John C. V. Pezzey,  
“The Symmetry between Controlling Pollution by Price and Controlling It by Quantity,” The Canadian Journal of Economics Vol 24, Issue 4 (1992): 983-991;  
John C. V. Pezzey and Frank Jotzo, “Tax-versus-trading and efficient revenue recycling as issues for greenhouse gas abatement,” Journal of Environmental 
 Economics and Management Vol 64, Issue 2 (2012): 230–236.
193 If a firm were allocated allowances on the basis of both its actual output and actual emission intensity, the volume of allowances granted would move in direct 
proportion to its carbon cost, and therefore the firm would effectively be exempted from some or all of the carbon cost.
Free allowance  
allocations
The most common policy mechanism that policy makers have used to address 
leakage to date is the provision of free allowances under ETSs.192 This reduces 
the financial cost of emissions for firms and is thus expected to reduce the risk 
of leakage. Free allowances can be allocated in many different ways, but the 
following two questions best characterize design efforts so far: 
 – Does the amount of free allowances vary with the output of the individual firm?
 – Is the amount of free allowances linked to the emissions of the individual firm? 
Combining the two questions offers four conceptually distinct approaches to 
assistance (Table 5).
Does allocation vary in proportion to a firm’s output?
Yes: Output-Based Allocation 
No: Fixed allocation based on a firm’s 
historical output with periodic updating
Is allocation 
linked to the 
emissions 
of individual 
firms?
Yes, allo-
cation is 
directly 
proportional 
to a firm’s 
emission 
intensity
This would effectively eliminate carbon 
price.193 To date, this approach has not been 
adopted.
Grandfathering: Allocations are directly linked to 
a firm’s historical emissions. Examples include 
the EU ETS Phases I and II, the Republic 
of Korea’s ETS (for all but three sectors), 
Kazakhstan’s ETS Phases I and II, and most 
sectors in the pilot ETSs of Beijing, Chongqing, 
Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai and Tianjin.
No, allo-
cation is 
bench-
marked to 
the emission 
intensity of 
the sector in 
question
Output-Based Allocation: Allocations 
are proportional to sector-wide product 
benchmarks and a firm’s current output levels. 
Examples of its implementation include the 
California Cap-and-Trade Program, New 
Zealand’s ETS, Australia’s former carbon pricing 
mechanism (CPM), the Republic of Korea’s 
ETS (in three sectors), and the Shenzhen ETS.
Fixed sector benchmarks: Allocations 
are proportional to sector-wide product 
benchmarks and firm-specific, historical 
activity levels. Output adjustments take 
place between phases. An example of its 
implementation is Phase III of the EU ETS. 
Free allocation approaches and their relationship to a firm‘s output and emission intensityTable 5 
Source: Authors, based on Vivid Economics: Technical note for the World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness 2015.
Note: Some schemes use grandfathering for the majority of their allocations but adopt benchmarking approaches for new entrants or capacity expansions. 
These schemes are categorized as grandfathering for simplicity. The Shanghai ETS pilot involves a hybrid approach that combining combines some elements of 
 grandfathering and benchmarking, and so thus is not included in this typology. 
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194 Frédéric Branger et al., EU ETS, Free Allocations and Activity Level Thresholds, the Devil Lies in the Details (Centre for Clima te Change Economics and Policy 
Working Paper No. 190, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper No. 169, October 2014).
Some countries provide different types of free allowance allocation for different 
sectors. Under the Republic of Korea’s ETS, the majority of sectors receive free 
allowances through a grandfathering approach in the first phase. However, the 
clinker, refineries, and aviation sectors have obtained assistance through output-
based allocation. This reflects the perceived relative ease of creating benchmarks 
in these three sectors. Policy makers have expressed a desire to shift increasingly 
toward the use of benchmarks in future phases. These different leakage risk 
mitigation measures are discussed in turn below, skipping free allocations that 
vary both with output and emission intensity, as this would effectively cancel the 
impact of carbon pricing. 
Annex II  – Integrated assistance measures to mitigate the risk of leakage 
Grandfathering Under a grandfathering approach, firms receive free allowances directly related 
to their historical emissions, and the amount does not automatically change 
with their future output. This ensures that incentives to reduce emissions are 
retained because even allowances received free of charge have a market value 
that can be cashed out through abatement investments. This feature, combined 
with administrative simplicity, has made grandfathering a popular method 
of providing assistance in the initial stages of many carbon pricing schemes. 
Prominent examples include the first two phases of the EU ETS, the first phase 
of the Republic of Korea’s ETS (for most sectors), Kazakhstan’s ETS, and various 
Chinese ETS pilots.
Existing grandfathering schemes periodically adjust free allocations to the 
changes in production levels. Free allowances are usually also canceled if firms 
do not maintain a minimum level of production. This normally takes place every 
three to seven years, as under the EU ETS and the Republic of Korea’s ETS, 
as well as under the various Chinese pilot ETSs. These adjustments weaken 
some of the incentives that grandfathering can provide to reduce output and can 
even shut down emissions-intensive facilities if the sale of unused allowances 
generates a higher profit than maintaining production. Another reason for 
reducing allowances with output is to prevent windfall profits. In particular, in 
Phase II of the EU ETS, unexposed firms, especially energy utilities, passed 
on the cost of their allowances to their customers, even though they did had 
not even had to pay for them. Furthermore, such adjustments, if not managed 
properly, create a temptation for “rent-seeking” by firms. When firms expect 
that updates to the volumes of allowances will be linked to the level of their 
emissions-intensive activities, they tend to increase their current emissions-
intensive output to receive more free allowances for the next period.194 These 
rent-seeking incentives disappear when firms expect that grandfathering will be 
replaced by an allocation scheme in which the volume of free allowances cannot 
be “gamed” so easily by individual firms.
76
195 European Commission - Climate Action, Free Allocation Based on Benchmarks, accessed August 10, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/ 
allocation/index_en.htm.
Fixed Sector 
Benchmarking (FSB)
Output-Based 
 Allocation (OBA)
Like grandfathering, this approach breaks the link between the emission intensity 
of an individual firm and the allowances this firm receives. However, in contrast 
to grandfathering, the level of assistance is determined not by reference to the 
current or historical emissions (intensity) of each individual firm, but by reference 
to a product-specific benchmark of emission intensity of the whole sector.
This is the approach adopted in Phase III of the EU ETS. The benchmark for free 
allowances is based on industry emissions performance, so that only the top 10 
percent performers receive free allowances to, in principle, cover 100 percent of 
their emissions. Other firms receive the same volume of free allowances as the 
best performers, but have to purchase additional allowances at the market price 
to cover their actual emissions.195 It provides an ongoing incentive for firms to 
outperform others in their sector in terms of emission efficiency. Benchmarks are 
also periodically updated, but opportunities for strategic gaming that increases 
emissions and windfall gains by individual firms are much weaker because the 
benchmark is derived from the performance of several firms.
OBA is similar to the benchmarking scheme, except that the changes in a firm’s 
output (upwards or downwards) lead to rapid, almost automatic, changes in 
allowance allocations. Variants on this basic model are used for providing assistance 
to firms in California, New Zealand, some sectors in Korea, and in Shenzhen.
OBAs preserve the incentives to reduce emission intensity, as do the other 
free allocation approaches, and give a competitive edge to emissions-efficient 
firms. More importantly, OBA offers stronger leakage protection than FSB and 
grandfathering. Under OBA, an increase of production by an extra unit will directly 
result in additional free emission allowances. The level at which a benchmark is 
set affects the level of protection against leakage. A stringent benchmark will 
offer weaker leakage protection, as most firms will have an emission intensity 
that is worse than the benchmark and, hence, will have to purchase many extra 
allowances to produce an extra unit of output. Conversely, a higher benchmark 
will better protect against leakage but could have a negative effect on the 
environmental outcome. The benchmarks are also often tightened over time. 
The key downside of OBA is that it could make the total environmental outcome 
of a carbon pricing scheme less certain, because the overall emissions cap can 
increase with the output of the industry. Without careful design, the environmental 
integrity of an emissions pricing scheme with OBA may be compromised. 
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196 Over the years, carbon tax exemptions have increased for installations under the EU ETS, with the most recent increase in exemption starting from 2014 for 
district heating plants participating in the EU ETS.
197 The coverage has subsequently been expanded to all plants producing more than 25MWh of useful energy. Source: OECD, 2013.
Exemptions 
Rebates 
Border Carbon 
 Adjustments (BCAs)
The design of carbon pricing schemes may include exempting some emissions 
(for example, by implementing carbon tax–free thresholds), exempting some 
sectors/firms from the scheme (for example, the Swedish carbon tax196), 
or setting reduced rates for them. Sometimes these exemptions are driven 
by practical difficulties, political sensitivities, or the high transaction costs of 
covering certain sectors. For example, small and dispersed emitters in transport, 
agriculture, forestry, and municipal waste are often exempt from an ETS. However, 
sometimes these exemptions are also motivated by concerns about leakage. 
While exemptions are effective in addressing leakage and administratively easy 
to implement, they fundamentally undermine the abatement incentives of carbon 
pricing. Reducing the effective carbon price means that abatement incentives 
are reduced as well. Exemptions, like grandfathering, may be useful when 
establishing a carbon pricing regime for the first time but should be accompanied 
by a credible plan for their eventual replacement with more targeted assistance. 
This thinking underpins the proposed South African carbon tax. 
Sometimes policymakers aim to reduce the leakage risks associated with carbon prices 
by reducing other taxes paid by the exposed industry, or providing other subsidies to 
industry, often of an equivalent amount. This is an approach most commonly adopted 
in countries pursuing a carbon tax. Often, rebates are funded by recycling a portion 
of the emissions tax revenue. Tax rebates preserve an incentive for firms to reduce 
their emission intensity, provided the rebates are not in proportion to emissions. They 
favor less emissions-intensive firms, without reducing the overall tax liability faced 
by the industry, although they may slow down the structural transformation marked 
by shifts in the shares of emissions-intensive and cleaner firms in the industry in 
question. Output-based rebates, such as in the case of the Swedish Nitrogen Oxide 
charge, have very similar properties to OBA and provide strong leakage protection, 
without compromising environmental integrity (OECD, 2013c).197 Alternatively, 
lump-sum rebates resemble grandfathering and FSB approaches. 
BCAs involve imposing an emission cost at the border on importers of carbon-
intensive goods and/or providing a rebate to firms exporting to third countries, 
unless those countries have an equivalent carbon pricing regime. BCAs can 
be introduced either as a border tax or, under an ETS, by requiring importers 
to surrender allowances for the GHG emissions associated with producing the 
imported goods or resources. The fundamental difference between BCAs and 
standard free allowance approaches is the effective extension of the carbon pricing 
regime to entities outside the implementing jurisdiction. This, in turn, dramatically 
changes the economic, environmental, and political effects of such a policy.
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198 J. Andrew Hoerner, The Role of Border Tax Adjustments in Environmental Taxation: Theory and U.S. Experience, Working Paper, March 19, 1988. 
199 IFPRI, “Biofuels, Environment, and Food: The Story Gets More Complicated,” in 2011 Global Food Policy Report, 2012; Madison Condon and Ada Ignaciuk, 
Border Carbon Adjustment and International Trade: A Literature Review, OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers, October 31, 2013; WTO, European 
Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry: Request for 
 Consultations by Argentina, WT/DS459/1, G/L/1027, G/SCM/D97/1,G/TRIMS/D/36, and G/TBT/D/44, 2013; Persson, 2010.
200 IISD, A Guide for the Concerned: Guidance on the Elaboration and Implementation of Border Carbon Adjustment, November 21, 2012.
201 Bruce F. Davie, Border Adjustments for Environmental Excise Taxes: The U.S. Experience, January 8, 1995; J. Andrew Hoerner, The Role of Border Tax 
 Adjustments in Environmental Taxation: Theory and U.S. Experience.
202 Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn, and Giovanni Ruta, “Trade, Climate Change, and the Political Game Theory of Border Carbon Adjustments,” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy Vol 28, Issue 2 (2012): 368–394.
203 Nordhaus, W., “Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy”, American Economic Review, 105(4): 1339–1370, 2015.
204 Stéphanie Monjon and Philippe Quirion, “A Border Adjustment for the EU ETS: Reconciling WTO Rules and Capacity to Tackle Carbon Leakage,” Climate Policy  
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BCAs have been widely modeled and discussed, but not often implemented. 
Article 10B.1 of the EU ETS Directive opens the possibility of applying BCA in the 
EU. Bearing some resemblance to a BCA, the emissions associated with imported 
electricity have to comply with the California Cap-and-Trade Program in the same 
way as emissions from electricity generated in California. In another example more 
broadly on border tax adjustments, the United States imposed a tax on imports 
whose production relied on ozone-depleting chemicals but also provided a tax 
rebate to manufacturers or exporters of those very same products.198
The modeling of BCAs generally suggests that BCAs would be effective in 
reducing leakage. However, the administrative difficulties associated with border 
adjustments may be substantial.199 Accounting for emissions embodied in the 
products and services imported from different places can be complex,200 although 
some say it is “administrable.”201 Considerable administrative challenges can arise 
from the fact that the legislator introducing BCAs has no jurisdictional reach 
to assure accurate measurement of emissions in third party companies, while 
practical experience has shown that accurate monitoring, reporting and third 
party verification of emissions is absolutely crucial for a well-functioning carbon 
market. BCAs may be easier to introduce in sectors with relatively homogenous 
products, such as cement.202 An alternative, simpler approach has been proposed: 
to impose a blanket tariff on all goods imported from non-participating countries 
without linking these tariffs to embedded emissions, to encourage third countries 
to join the “climate policy club.”203 
Legal considerations will influence any design but many commentators suggest 
these considerations will not represent an insuperable barrier. World Trade 
Organization requirements might possibly be met if BCAs demonstrate their 
effectiveness at reducing emissions rather than at addressing carbon leakage.204 
Yet the political challenges may be as great, or greater, than any legal constraints, 
as demonstrated by the experience of the EU in seeking to establish a regime that 
bore some resemblance to a BCA in the civil aviation sector. Trade disputes can 
spill over to many areas of international relations, making BCA a very expensive 
policy for the affected parties. Some experts suggest that the larger the market 
power of a coalition of countries applying border adjustments, the more feasible 
the BCA will be. 
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GLOSSARY
The industrialized countries listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC were committed 
to return their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. They currently include 
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union. 
Annex I Parties are issued AAUs up to the level of their assigned amount, 
corresponding to the quantity of GHG they can release in accordance with the 
Kyoto Protocol (Article 3), during the first commitment period of that protocol 
(2008–12). One AAU represents the right to emit one metric ton of carbon 
dioxide equivalent. 
The European Commission’s temporary postponement of the auctioning of 900 
million allowances from 2014–16 to 2019–20 by changing the auctioning 
timeline to rebalance supply and demand of emission allowances in the EU ETS 
in the short term. 
Compliance units under the various schemes to manage GHG emissions in 
existence may or may not be carried over from one commitment period to the 
next. Banking may encourage early action by mandated entities, depending 
on their current situation and their anticipation of future carbon constraints. In 
addition, banking brings market continuity. Banking between Phase I and Phase 
II of the EU ETS is not allowed; it is allowed between Phase II and further phases. 
Some restrictions on the amount of units that can be carried over may apply; for 
instance, EUAs may be banked with no restriction, while the amount of CERs that 
can be carried over by a Kyoto Party is limited to 2.5% of the assigned amount 
of each Party.
Annex I (Parties)
Assigned Amount 
Unit (AAU)
Backloading
Banking or Carry over
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The emission of GHG that would occur without the policy intervention or project 
activity under consideration. 
Benchmarking is used to compare the operations of one company with those 
of others, with the industry average, or with best practice, to determine whether 
they have opportunities to improve energy efficiency or reduce GHG emissions. 
In the EU ETS, for example, free allocation is carried out on the basis of ambitious 
benchmarks of GHG emissions performance. These benchmarks reward best 
practice in low-emission production.
Cap-and-trade schemes set a desired maximum ceiling for emissions (or cap) 
and let the market determine the price for keeping emissions within that cap. To 
comply with their emission targets at least cost, regulated entities can either opt 
for internal abatement measures or acquire allowances or emission reductions in 
the carbon market, depending on the relative costs of these options.
The universal unit of measurement used to indicate the global warming potential 
of each of the six GHGs regulated under the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon dioxide—a 
naturally occurring gas that is a by-product of burning fossil fuels and biomass, 
land use changes, and other industrial processes—is the reference gas against 
which the other GHG are measured, using their global warming potential.
Resources provided to activities generating (or expected to generate) GHG 
emission reductions through the transaction of such emission reductions.
Shift in CO2 emissions from countries taking stringent actions to countries taking 
less stringent mitigation actions. 
A tax that explicitly states a price on carbon or that uses a metric directly based 
on carbon (that is, price per tCO2e). 
A pool of CO2 allowances, established by the RGGI states and replenished at 
the start of each calendar year, which creates a fixed, additional supply of CO2 
allowances that are only available for sale if CO2 allowance prices exceed certain 
prices levels.
A unit of GHG emission reductions issued pursuant to the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol and measured in metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent. One CER represents a reduction in GHG emissions of one metric ton 
of carbon dioxide equivalent.
The NDRC issued rules to regulate the voluntary emission reduction credits 
market in China, in the form of CCERs, in June 2012. These will be issued in 
units of tCO2e, and will include CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6.
Baseline
Benchmarking
Cap-and-Trade
Carbon Dioxide 
 Equivalent (CO2e)
Carbon Finance
Carbon Leakage
Carbon tax 
Cost Containment 
Reserve (CCR)
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER)
Chinese Certified 
Emission Reduction 
(CCER)
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Glossary
The mechanism provided by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, designed to assist 
developing countries in achieving sustainable development by allowing entities 
from Annex I Parties to participate in low-carbon projects and obtain CERs in 
return. 
The supreme body of the UNFCCC. It currently meets once a year to review the 
UNFCCC‘s progress. The word „conference“ is not used here in the sense of 
„meeting“ but rather of „association,“ which explains the seemingly redundant 
expression „fourth session of the Conference of the Parties.“
The UNFCCC’s supreme body is the COP, which serves as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The sessions of the COP and the CMP are held 
during the same period to reduce costs and improve coordination between the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
The measurable reduction of release of GHG into the atmosphere from a 
specified activity, and a specified period.
A unit of emission reductions issued pursuant to Joint Implementation. One ERU 
represents the right to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): See cap-and-trade. 
The allowances in use under the EU ETS. An EUA unit is equal to one metric ton 
of carbon dioxide equivalent.
The 5-year period, from 2008 to 2012, during which industrialized countries 
committed to collectively reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% 
compared with 1990 emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.
Defined at COP 17 in Durban, general framework at the UNFCCC level that allows 
various approaches—including opportunities for using markets to enhance the 
cost effectiveness of mitigation actions and promote their use, bearing in mind 
the different circumstances of developed and developing countries—which must 
meet standards that deliver real, permanent, additional and verified mitigation 
outcomes, avoid double counting of effort, and achieve a net decrease and/or 
avoidance of GHG emissions.
Both natural and anthropogenic, GHGs trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere, 
causing the greenhouse effect. Water vapor (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), and ozone (O3) are the primary GHGs. The 
emission of GHGs through human activities (such as fossil fuel combustion and 
deforestation) and their accumulation in the atmosphere are responsible for an 
additional forcing, contributing to climate change. 
Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
Conference of the 
Parties (COP)
Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties 
(CMP)
Emission Reduction
Emission Reduction 
Unit (ERU)
Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS)
European Union 
 Allowance (EUA)
First Commitment 
 Period under the 
 Kyoto Protocol (CP1)
Framework for 
 Various Approaches 
(FVA)
Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG)
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Sets the climate actions (mitigation and adaptation) that a country intends to take 
under the new international agreement to be negotiated under the UNFCCC in 
Paris in December 2015. 
A price on GHG emissions that a company uses internally to guide its business 
decisions. 
Mechanism provided by Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol whereby entities from 
Annex I Parties may participate in low-carbon projects hosted in Annex I countries 
and obtain Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) in return.
The Kyoto Protocol regulates six GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
The three so-called flexibility mechanisms that may be used by Annex I Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol to fulfill their commitments. These are Joint Implementation 
(JI, Article 6), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, Article 12), and 
International Emissions Trading (Article 17).
Protocol that commits industrialized country signatories to collectively reduce 
their GHG emissions by at least 5.2% below 1990 levels on average over 
2008–12 while developing countries can take no-regret actions and participate 
voluntarily in emission reductions and removal activities through the CDM. It was 
adopted at the third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Kyoto, 
Japan, in December 1997, and entered into force in February 2005. 
Refers to a set of mitigation policies and/or actions a developing country 
undertakes aimed at reducing its GHG emissions and on which countries 
report to UNFCCC on a voluntary basis. NAMAs were defined in 2007 under 
the UNFCCC Bali Action Plan as “Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions by 
developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported 
and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable, 
reportable and verifiable manner.” 
New market-based mechanism to promote mitigation actions and enhance their 
cost effectiveness, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and 
developing countries (as guided by decision 1/CP.18, paragraph 51); operating 
under the guidance and authority of the COP; defined at COP 17 in Durban. It 
may help developed countries meet part of their mitigation targets under the 
UNFCCC but should consider the principle of supplementarity. 
Designates the emission reductions from project-based activities that can be 
used to meet compliance or corporate citizenship objectives vis-à-vis GHG 
mitigation.
Intended  Nationally 
Determined 
 Contribution (INDC)
Internal carbon price
Joint Implementation 
(JI)
Kyoto GHGs
Kyoto Mechanisms
Kyoto Protocol
Nationally  Appropriate 
Mitigation Action 
(NAMA)
New Market-based 
Mechanism (NMM)
Offset
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Glossary
A transaction between the original owner (or issuer) of the carbon asset and a 
buyer.
All activities that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and 
contribute to conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks.
The formal acceptance by the CDM Executive Board of a validated project as a 
CDM project activity. 
Funding approach where payments are made only after predefined outputs or 
outcomes, such as emission reductions, have been delivered and verified.
The 8-year period, from 2013 through 2020, in which Annex I Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18% below 
1990 levels. The composition of Parties in the second commitment period is 
different from that in the first. 
A transaction where the seller is not the original owner (or issuer) of the carbon 
asset.
Following the Marrakesh Accords, the use of the Kyoto mechanisms shall be 
supplemental to domestic action, which shall thus constitute a significant 
element of the effort made by each Party to meet its commitment under the 
Kyoto Protocol. There is no quantitative limit, however, to the use of such 
mechanisms. Supplementarity also needs to be considered in the development 
of modalities and procedures for the UNFCCC NMM (Draft decision -/CP.18, 
para 51, February 28, 2013).
An online database that holds accounts for stationary installations that have been 
transferred from national registries, as well as accounts for aircraft operators, 
which have been included in the EU ETS since January 2012. The Union registry 
replaces EU member states’ national registries.
The international legal framework adopted in June 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit 
to address climate change. It commits the Parties to the UNFCCC to stabilize 
human-induced GHG emissions at levels that would prevent dangerous, man-
made interference with the climate system, following “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” based on “respective capabilities.”
The process of independent evaluation of a project activity by a Designated 
Operational Entity (DOE) against the requirements of the CDM. The CDM 
requirements include the CDM modalities and procedures, subsequent decisions 
by the CMP, and documents released by the CDM Executive Board.
Primary Transaction
REDD Plus (REDD+)
Registration
Results-Based 
 Finance (RBF)
Second Commitment 
Period under the 
 Kyoto Protocol (CP2) 
Secondary 
 Transaction
Supplementarity
Union Registry
United  Nations 
 Framework 
 Convention on  Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)
Validation
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The review and ex-post determination by an independent third party of the 
monitored reductions in emissions generated by a registered CDM project or a 
determined JI project (or a project approved under another standard) during the 
verification period.
A unit of GHG emission reductions that has been verified by an independent 
auditor. Most often, this designates emission reduction units that are traded on 
the voluntary market.
The market that caters to the needs of those entities that voluntarily decide 
to reduce their carbon footprint using offsets. The regulatory vacuum in some 
countries and the anticipation of imminent legislation on GHG emissions also 
motivates some pre-compliance activity.
Verification
Verified Emission 
Reduction (VER)
Voluntary Carbon 
Market
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Notes

Notes

www.carbonfinance.org
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433 USA
